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GO WORLD

Spring 1997 NO. 79

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KISEIDO PUBLISHING COMPANY

The Latest Book in the *Get Strong at Go* Series

Get Strong at the Endgame


How do you win a won game? How do you win a lost game?

Study the endgame! More specifically, study this latest addition to Kiseido's *Get Strong at Go* series: *Get Strong at the Endgame*.

It would be an exaggeration to say that most games are decided in the endgame, but there is no question that a great many upsets are pulled off at this stage. Players often come out of the opening with a clear advantage, only to see it dwindle away in the endgame. On the other hand, if you find that you are behind after the opening and the middle game, the surest way to stage an upset is to become a strong endgame player. You will also find that the key to winning handicap games with white is not necessarily to study handicap openings and josekis, but to get strong in the endgame.


The endgame is the most difficult part of the game to play well. It is also the most difficult to study, but this book takes the drudgery out of it. *Get Strong at the Endgame* starts out with a 42-problem test. Unless you are already stone in the endgame, expect to do badly, but after studying the 120 endgame-tesuji problems in Part Two and the 101 endgame-calculation problems in Part Three, you should have no trouble scoring close to 100% when you go back and retake this test. At that point, you will be eager to try out your newly developed skill with your go-playing friends, at your local go club, or on the Internet.

The book ends with 28 problems on 11x11 boards which illustrate the interplay between different-valued endgame moves in realistic situations. Studying these problems will help you understand when to forgo sente moves for gote moves, or, instead of playing a gote move, when to go on the initiative with a sente move. For example, in the position on the right, what is the best endgame sequence for Black? The best sequence for White?




Another feature of this book is the calculation of endgame moves which arise from commonly played josekis, calculation of the varieties of hanes and connections on the first and second line, calculation of the monkey jump in different positions, and many others.

However, the part of this book which will give your endgame ability the biggest boost is Part Two, which is a survey of the most common endgame tesujis. It is this section that will change the way you look at the endgame. For example, in the position in *Dia. 1*, crawling with Black 1 is usually the correct endgame move, but here, because of the thinness of White's position, the placement of Black 1 in *Dia. 2* is worth two additional points.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Price: \$15.00 plus s/h

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Go World News

January–April 1997

by John Power

International

Current international champions

1st LG Cup final: Lee leads Yoo 2–0.
8th Fujitsu Cup (1996): Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
8th Tong Yang Securities Cup (1997): Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea)
1st Samsung Cup (1996): Yoda (Japan)
3rd Ing Cup (1996–97): Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)
8th TV Asia Cup (1996): Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
11th Japan–China Super Go: China won 7–2.
5th Jinro Cup: Korea beat Japan and China.


1st LG Cup: Lee takes the lead over Yoo

Perhaps because of the crowded schedule of Korean players, only now is the final of the 1st LG Cup, an international tournament launched in June 1996, being played. The players who won their way to the best-of-five final were both Korean: Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk.

The first two games of the final were played in Korea in March, and both were won by Lee. He needs just one more win in the match, which will resume in May, to take the first prize of 100 million won (about 27 million yen or \$210,000).

Seo destroys Japanese and Chinese teams in Jinro Cup in unprecedented winning streak

Since winning the 2nd Ing Cup in 1993, the veteran Korean player Seo Bong-soo (born on 1 February 1953) has tended to take a back seat to younger Korean players like Yoo Chang-hyuk and Lee Chang-ho, but he has now scored a triumph that even they might envy. In the 5th Jinro Cup, a rotating knockout tournament among five-player teams from Korea, China, and Japan, Seo almost singlehandedly destroyed the opposing teams, winning nine games in a row for a winning streak that stands alone in international go.



Seo Bong-soo: a new record for international go

The tournament started ordinarily enough, with Yu Bin 9-dan of China defeating Kim 4-dan of Korea and Awaji Shuzo 9-dan of Japan. Then the mayhem started. The second batter for Korea was Seo, who defeated Yu, Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan (Japan), Chang Hao 7-dan (China), Yamada Kimio 7-dan (Japan), Cao Dayuan 9-dan (China), O Rissei 9-dan (Japan), Chen Linxin 9-dan (China), and Yoda Norimoto 9-dan (Japan). That gave Seo eight wins in a row.

The 11th and final game of the tournament was played in Beijing on 23 February. Seo convincingly defeated the Chinese captain Ma Xiaochun 9-dan to wrap up the series. Korea has monopolized the Jinro Cup to date, but none of its wins has been as decisive as this one.

One of the distinctive features of this tournament is special prizes for winning streaks. Seo received \$70,000 for his effort. The team prize is \$200,000, and it is reported that half of this will go to Seo.



Cho Hun-hyun (left) defeats Kobayashi Satoru in the Tong Yang Securities Cup.

8th Tong Yang Securities Cup: Cho Hun-hyun defeats Kobayashi Satoru

Nothing has been going right for Kobayashi Satoru this year. The one exception was the Tong Yang Securities Cup, in which he was the only Japanese player to reach the semifinals (in the LG Cup last year, he had been the only Japanese player to reach the quarterfinals — see GW78, page 4). In the quarterfinal, he beat Cho Chikun (Cho is entered as a Korean player in this tournament, which accounts for the pairing). In the semifinal, he was matched against Lee Chang-ho, a player who had won all their four previous games. Thanks to a middle-game brilliancy, Kobayashi picked up his first win against the Korean prodigy and so reached the final.

Here his winning run came to an abrupt end. His opponent, Cho Hoon-hyun, dominated the best-of-five match, winning three straight games. Actually, Kobayashi slipped up on the point of victory in the first game, missing a surprisingly simple move. After that, Cho had it all his own way and won this title for the second time.

Results in the final:

Game 1 (31 March). Cho (B) by 6½ points.

Game 2 (2 April). Cho (W) by resig.

Game 3 (18 April). Cho (B) by resig.

Tournament highlights:

Round 1 (Seoul, 7 Jan. 1997). Chang Hao 7-dan (China's hero in the 11th Japan-China Super Go) beat Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea), O Rissei 9-dan (Japan) beat Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan (Korea).

Round 2. Cho Chikun 9-dan (Korea) beat Chang Hao, Wang Lei 6-dan (China) beat Takemiya Masaki 9-dan (Japan), Ryu Shikun 6-dan (playing for Japan, though he comes from Korea) beat Nie Weiping 9-dan (China), Lee Chang-ho 9-dan (Korea) beat Kato Masao 9-dan (Japan), Ma 9-dan (China) beat Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (Japan).

Quarterfinals (Seoul, 13 Feb.). Kobayashi Satoru beat Cho Chikun, Kim 4-dan (Korea) beat Ryu, Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) beat Wang Lei, Lee beat Ma.

Semifinals (Seoul, 9 March). Kobayashi beat Lee, Cho beat Kim (previously, the semifinal had been a best-of-three match, but this has been eliminated, as it imposes too heavy a burden on the players in this age of proliferating international tournaments).

10th Fujitsu Cup: Rare setback for Korea, new hero for China

The results of the first two rounds of the 10th Fujitsu Cup were far from typical of recent international tournaments: making the



The start of the game between Kobayashi Koichi (left) and Seo Bong-soo

quarterfinals were five Nihon Ki-in representatives, three Chinese players — and not one Korean. It's a long time since the Koreans, who have established themselves as the world's top go-playing nation, have fared so badly.

The Fujitsu Cup always features an upset or two. This time one player who has been responsible for more than his fair share found himself out of luck. Jimmy Cha 4-dan of the U.S.A. bowed out in the first round with a loss to Yu Bin 9-dan of China. Taking up the slack was the 17-year-old Chou Chun-hsün of Chinese Taipei, who came 4th in the 15th WAGC in 1993. He defeated Otake Hideo of Japan in the first round, though in the second he was eliminated by Takemiya. Another surprise in the first round was the loss of the great Korean player Cho Hoon-hyun to the Kansai Ki-in's young star Yuki Satoshi 8-dan, who had fallen victim to Jimmy Cha in the previous Fujitsu Cup. Another interesting game in the first round was the one between Rob van Zeijst, representing Europe, and Seo Bong-soo of Korea. Last year Van Zeijst beat two Korean professionals in international tournaments in Korea and, according to *Go*

Weekly, he held the lead at one point; in the end, however, he found himself outgunned by Seo.

There was good news for China in the second round, with the emergence of a new hero: the 20-year-old Zhou Heyang 6-dan. Zhou was almost completely unknown in Japan, but a close look at the program revealed that he had won the All-China Individual Championship in 1996. After beating Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan of Korea in the first round, Zhou found himself matched against the world's undisputed number one player (see the box on current world champions) and previous Fujitsu champion, 21-year-old Lee Chang-ho of Korea. Zhou played a spectacular game: he got into a losing capturing race with a ko attached early in the game, but he judiciously switched elsewhere and skilfully used the aji of his lost group to pull off a half-point win.

Another setback for Korea came when Seo was convincingly outplayed by Kobayashi Koichi of Japan. Kobayashi has frequently placed well in the Fujitsu Cup without actually winning it — this might be his year. The final member of the powerful Korean quartet that has dominated world

go, Yoo Chang-hyuk, was eliminated by Cho Chikun.

One game that aroused comment in the second round was the encounter between O Rissei and Liu Xiaoguang of China. Liu played a trick move in the 'large avalanche' joseki, startling O Rissei. As he related later, O asked himself: 'Does Liu know that I've written a book on new variations in the large avalanche?' Apparently not — O easily refuted the trick move and scored a crushing win.

Full results in Rounds 1 & 2

Round 1 (12 April)

Chou Chun-hsün 2-dan (Ch. Taipei) beat Otake Hideo 9-dan (Japan), Zhou Heyang 6-dan (China) b. Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan (Korea), Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea) b. Rob van Zeijst (Europe), Yuki Satoshi 8-dan (Japan) b. Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan (Korea), Yu Bin 9-dan (China) b. Jimmy Cha 4-dan (North America), O Meien 9-dan (Japan) b. Wang Lei 6-dan (China), O Rissei (Japan) b. Yang Jae-ho 9-dan (Korea), Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan (Korea) b. Senfeng Wang (South America).

Round 2 (14 April)

Takemiya Masaki 9-dan (Japan) b. Chou, Zhou b. Lee Chang-ho (Korea), Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan (Japan) b. Seo, Chang Hao 7-dan (China) b. Yuki, Rin Kaiho 9-dan (Japan) b. Yu, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (Japan) b. O Meien, O Rissei b. Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan (China), Cho Chikun 9-dan (Japan) b. Yoo.

Quarterfinal pairings (7 June, Beijing)

Takemiya vs. Zhou, Kobayashi vs. Chang, Rin vs. Ma, O vs. Cho

Japan

Cho Chikun defends 21st Kisei Title

The Japanese tournament year is launched by its richest title match, the Kisei. This year, for the third year in a row, the match featured the same pairing: Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Satoru. In 1995, Kobayashi took the title from Cho 4-2, only to lose it 3-4 last year. Taking the top title even once is a great achievement, but Kobayashi was determined to show that he was no flash in the pan, with just one good year to



Kobayashi looks regretful, Cho looks thoughtful, Ishida is perhaps throwing some light on what happened: the conclusion of the 1997 Kisei title match.

his credit (he also won the Gosei title in 1995, but lost it last year).

Cho got off to a good start in his Kisei defence — and in the first leg of his 'triple crown' defence — with a one-sided win in the first game, which was played in Hawaii.

The second game was more closely fought, but basically Cho had the edge throughout. The game was notable for the way he kept playing all-out right to the end.

The series looked like becoming interesting when Kobayashi made a good comeback in the third game. He followed up with wins against Cho in the Tong Yang Securities Cup in Seoul (13 February) and in the NEC Cup semifinal in Osaka (15 February), giving him three wins in a row, but Cho bounced back with a win where it counted. He took the fourth Kisei game, and Kobayashi suddenly found himself faced with a *kadoban*.

The fifth game is probably the one that Kobayashi will regret the most. He seemed to have set up a win, but he faltered in the second half of the game. The losing move was an elementary blunder in the endgame that cost him four points.

Full results:

Game 1 (15, 16 January 1997) (Hawaii). Cho Chikun (B) won by resignation.

Game 2 (29, 30 Jan.). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 3 (5, 6 Feb.). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

Game 4 (19, 20 Feb.). Cho (W) won by resig.

Game 5 (26, 27 Feb.). Cho (B) won by 1½ points.

1997 Go Calendar: January

16: Cho Chikun starts the 21st Kisei title match with a win.

Kato takes Judan title from Yoda

Unlucky Yamada

Kato Masao, winner of the losers' section in the 35th Judan tournament, defeated Yamada Kimio 7-dan, winner of the winners' section, in the playoff between the two sections, held on 6 February. Yamada beat Kato in the quarterfinal of the winners' section, so Kato got his revenge. One can't help feeling sorry for Yamada: besides Kato, he beat Kataoka, Komatsu, and Kobayashi Koichi to

win the winners' section, but unlike every other player the winner of this section gets no second chance.



Kato starts his 50s in style, winning the Judan title and the Honinbo league.

Kato defeats Yoda in title match

In the title match, Yoda, the defending Judan title holder, was the clear favourite, mainly because of his relative youth (31) and his excellent results recently in domestic and international tournaments. However, Kato has been the in-form player this year; moreover, as the go writer Akiyama Kenji has pointed out, he had a pattern of starting each new decade in his life with a 'big bang'. According to Confucius, in a man's life, 30 is the year of 'self-establishment'. The year he turned 30, Kato won the Honinbo title, his first best-of-seven title, and got married. Forty is the 'age when one becomes free from vacillation' — that certainly applies to Kato, for at 40 he reached the peak of his career, winning four titles, including his first Meijin title. Akiyama calls this his second 'big bang'.

Fifty is the age when one 'understands life'. Based on this Confucian pattern and Kato's past record, Akiyama predicted that Kato would win some titles this year and he has already been proved right.

Kato made a good start by winning the

first game, but Yoda recovered to take the second and third games. At this point, Lady Luck stepped in. Yoda had the lead in the fourth game and his third Judan title seemed a certainty, but he made a bad blunder and lost by half a point. Yoda had miscounted, however, and thought he was half a point ahead, so it was not until he had spent some time scrutinizing the game record that he accepted his defeat (even if players miscount the score, the result, even if it's wrong, cannot be changed once the loser verbally accepts it).

That set the stage for a dramatic close to the series, and once again the result was a half-pointer, though this time it was not an upset like the fourth game. Kato thus won the match 3-2 and secured his first Judan title for ten years and his seventh (a record) overall.

The successive half-point wins that decided the match bring back memories of the 21st Judan title match in 1983, when he took the title from Cho Chikun with three half-point wins.

Another interesting aspect of the match was Kato's fondness for playing the 3-4 point in the opening; this was not only a contrast to his youthful fuseki style, but was also a breath of fresh air in the star-point-dominated contemporary go scene.

Full results

Game 1 (6 March). Kato (W) by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 2 (19 March). Yoda (W) by $10\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 3 (3 April). Yoda (B) by resignation.

Game 4 (10 April). Kato (B) by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Game 5 (17 April). Kato (B) by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

1997 Go Calendar: February

6: Kato becomes Judan challenger.

23: Seo of Korea beats Ma of China, completing a nine-game winning streak in the 5th Jinro Cup.

27: Cho defends the Kisei title 4-1.

Kato to challenge for Honinbo title

1997 has been a great year for Kato so far. As of 25 April, he tops the list of players with most wins, with 18; more important than the quantity, however, is the quality — these wins included victory in the Judan title match and in the Honinbo league.

The 52nd Honinbo league was a hard-fought one: after the first three rounds, there was no player with either three wins or three losses, which is unusual. However, in his sixth-round game on 17 March, Kato defeated the player who was perhaps his most dangerous rival, Ryu Shikun, and took the sole lead. In his final-round game, played on 31 March, Kato defeated Yo Kagen and so secured the right to challenge Cho Chikun for the title. Kato also challenged Cho the year before last; he was able to win only one game then, but he seems to be enjoying better form this year, so he has to be given a chance of taking his first Honinbo title for 18 years. Although he has turned 50, Kato claims to be in the best physical condition of his life — he claims that he doesn't feel tired after his games. The title match, which starts on 12 May, should be an interesting one.

Ryu's second place on 5-2 confirms, if confirmation were needed, that he is firmly established as one of the top players.

52nd Honinbo League (Title-holder: Cho Chikun)

Rank		RS	KM	YK	KS	RK	HN	KH	CS	Won	Lost
1	Ryu Shikun		●	○	○	○	●	○	○	5	2
2	Kato Masao	○		○	●	○	○	○	○	6	1
3	Yo Kagen	●	●		○	●	●	○	●	2	5
4	Kataoka Satoshi	●	○	●		●	○	○	●	3	4
5	Rin Kaiho	●	●	○	○		●	○	●	3	4
5	Hikosaka Naoto	○	●	○	●	○		●	○	4	3
5	Komatsu Hideki	●	●	●	●	●	○		●	1	6
5	Cho Sonjin	●	●	○	○	○	●	○		4	3

1997 Go Calendar: March

- 1: Kato wins NEC Cup.
- 5: Nishida Terumi wins Women's Meijin.
- 9: Kobayashi Satoru beats Lee Chang-ho in semifinal of Tong Yang Securities Cup.
- 17: Kato defeats Ryu to take sole lead in Honinbo league.
- 22: Yoda wins JT Cup.
- 23: Seo Bong-soo scores ninth win in a row to win Jinro Cup for Korea.
- 23 (date of telecast): O wins NHK Cup.
- 24: Kobayashi Koichi wins Kakusei.
- 31: Kato wins Honinbo league 6-1.

Equal third were Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan and Cho Sonjin 8-dan, who both made very successful league debuts.

Incidentally, this was quite a cosmopolitan league. Cho and Ryu are both Korean, and Rin and Yo Kagen are both Taiwanese citizens.

O Rissei wins 44th NHK Cup

After two second places, O Rissei has won his first NHK Cup. In the final played on 2 March (telecast on 23 March), he defeated Kobayashi Koichi by 7½ points. First prize is 4 million yen (about \$32,500).



O Rissei seems pleased to be holding his first NHK Cup.

Earlier in the tournament, the main talking points were the success of the great veteran Sakata, winner of 11 NHK Cups, and tournament newcomer So Kofuku. Sakata,

then 76 (he turned 77 in February), defeated Yo Kagen and Kato Masao before succumbing to Kobayashi Koichi. The 32-year old So Kofuku 7-dan defeated Ishii Kunio 9-dan, Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan, and Komatsu Hideki 9-dan before being eliminated by O Rissei.

Kato wins his third NEC Cup

The NEC Cup has the richest prize of the 'fast go' tournaments: 10 million yen (nearly \$79,000). This year the 16th Cup was won by Kato Masao, who has been enjoying great form so far this year. In the final, played in Tokyo on 1 March before 2,000 go fans, Kato (White) defeated Kobayashi Satoru by 1½ points. Kato previously won the NEC Cup in 1991 and 1992.

The time allowance in this tournament is 10 minutes per player plus 30 seconds per move, and the games are played in various locations around Japan over the course of about a year. They are always very popular and attract large audiences.

Just for the record, Kobayashi defeated Cho and Kato defeated Kobayashi Koichi in the semifinals. The parallel 12th NEC Young Stars (*Shun'ei*) tournament was won by Yo Kagen 7-dan. In the final, he defeated Nishida Terumi, Women's Meijin. If Nishida had won, it would have been the first victory ever by a woman player in a tournament open to both men and women.

Nishida defends Women's Meijin title

The challenger for the 9th Women's Meijin title was Ogawa Tomoko 6-dan, who now qualifies for the perhaps unwelcome term of 'veteran'. She defeated Yoshida Mika, Women's Honinbo, who in recent years has established herself as the top woman player in Japan, in the playoff to decide the challenger, but she was unable to prevail against the defending champion, Nishida Terumi, Women's Meijin.

The first game (26 February) was an epic struggle, lasting 300 moves. Nishida (Black) won by 6½ points, and perhaps that gave her some momentum for the second game. That was played on 5 March, and Nishida forced Ogawa to resign, thus defending her title. First prize is ¥4,500,000 (about \$35,000).

1997 Go Calendar: April

14: Five Nihon Ki-in and three Chinese, no Korean, players make Fujitsu Cup q'finals.
 17: Kato wins Judan title from Yoda 3-2.
 18: Cho Hoon-hyun defeats Kobayashi Satoru 3-0 in Tong Yang Securities Cup.
 •Two Europeans, Hans Pietsch and Catalin Taranu, debut as professionals at the Nihon Ki-in.

Yoda wins JT Cup

The JT (Japan Tobacco) Cup: Zodiac Tournament has two unique features: the preliminaries group players according to the signs of the zodiac and, though it is a *haya-go* tournament, play is split into morning and afternoon sessions. The players play an hour in the morning, then after lunch resume play in front of an audience while a public commentary is given — on the same stage. Presumably they tune out the discussion of their mistakes.

The 3rd JT final, played at the Nihon Ki-in on 22 March, featured a clash between the two leading representatives of the younger generation, Yoda Norimoto and Ryu Shikun. Yoda prevailed by 1½ points and won his first JT Cup and prize money of ¥3,500,000 (about \$27,500).

Kobayashi Koichi wins 19th Kakusei

In what was heralded in the go press as a sign of a possible return to top form, Kobayashi Koichi defeated Kato Masao by resignation to win his second Kakusei title. The final was played at the Nihon Ki-in on 24 March. This is a *haya-go* tournament, with a time allowance of one hour per player. First prize is ¥5,100,000 (about \$40,000).

New Stars Tournament

This title, open to players up to 7-dan and 30 years of age, was won by Yo Kagen 7-dan (age 26). Yo, currently in both Meijin and Honinbo leagues, defeated Kurotaki Masanori 5-dan in the final.

Catalin Taranu and Hans Pietsch make professional debut

Catalin Taranu (born on 31 March 1973) of Romania has become the fourth Westerner to become a professional go

player in Japan. He follows in the footsteps of Manfred Wimmer at the Kansai Ki-in (active 1978-80) and James Kerwin (1978 on) and Michael Redmond (1981 on) at the Nihon Ki-in. Catalin is a disciple of Saijo Masataka 8-dan and he took first place in the qualifying tournament at the Central Japan (Nagoya) branch of the Nihon Ki-in with 24 wins to 12 losses. He made his professional debut in April.

Catalin was followed by Hans Pietsch of Germany at the Tokyo branch of the Nihon Ki-in. After coming close to making professional a couple of times in the insei promotion tournament, Hans was given special permission to become professional shodan and he made his debut in late April. Born on 27 September 1968, Hans came to Japan in October 1990 and is a disciple of Kobayashi Chizu and Kobayashi Satoru.

Both Catalin and Hans have already scored their first wins as professionals.

3rd Ricoh Cup: Professional Pair Go Championship

In the final of this tournament, held at the Hilton Hotel in Hawaii after Game 1 of the Kisei title match, Chinen Kaori 2-dan and Yuki Satoshi 8-dan defeated Tsukuda Akiko 1-dan and Otake Hideo 9-dan.

1997 spring promotions

To 9-dan: Yuki Satoshi (he became the 99th active 9-dan in Japan)

To 8-dan: Yo Kagen

22nd Meijin league

Kobayashi Koichi made best start, being the only player to win his first three games, but he stumbled in the fourth round, losing to Kato. After five rounds, there were three players on 4-1: Kobayashi, O Rissei, and Kataoka Satoshi

Some crucial games were played on 1 May. Kato beat Kataoka, so the latter dropped out of the lead. O Rissei beat Kobayashi Koichi, thus securing the sole lead on 5-1. Anything could still happen in the last two rounds, but O now has a good chance of making his first challenge for a top-three title.

The league chart is given on page 10.

22nd Meijin league (Title-holder: Cho Chikun)

(as of 1 May 1997)

Rank		TM	OR	KM	KK	KS	RK	YN	RS	YK	Won	Lost
1	Takimiya Masaki					●	○	●			3	2
2	O Rissei			○	○	●	○				5	1
3	Kato Masao		●			○	○		●		3	2
4	Kobayashi Koichi		●	●					○	○	4	2
5	Kataoka Satoshi	○	○	●	●			○			4	2
6	Rin Kaiho	●	●	●				●	●		0	5
7	Yoda Norimoto		●		●	●	○				2	3
7	Ryu Shikun	●		○	●						2	2
7	Yo Kagen	●	●		●	●					0	4

Kido Prizes & The 1996 Tournament Year in Statistics

Kido prizes for 1996

1. The most outstanding player: Cho Chikun (this is the sixth time Cho has won this prize, so he draws level with Kato and Kobayashi Koichi).
2. Outstanding players: Yoda Norimoto, Ryu Shikun
3. Most wins: Hane Naoki 6-dan: 48
4. Most games: Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan: 66. (Kataoka fell just short of the record of 67, held by Kato. Foreign tournaments are not counted, or Cho Chikun would have won with 74.)
5. Best winning percentage: Yamada Kimio 7-dan: 81.3%
6. Most successive wins: Muramatsu Ryuichi 7-dan: 15
7. 'New face' prize: Takao Shinji 5-dan (40-16)
8. Outstanding woman player: Nishida Terumi (17-14)

(In 1996, the qualifying line for categories 3 to 6 was changed from 7-dan to 5-dan. Professionals 5-dan and above are referred to as 'high dan' players; also, 1-dan to 4-dan players compete in the 1st preliminary rounds of tournaments, so they get the chance to play extra games.)

The 1996 Tournament Year in Statistics

These statistics are taken from *Igo Club*, which maintains the traditional dividing line between 6-dan and 7-dan.

Top prize money winners

1. Cho Chikun: ¥133,672,900
2. Yoda Norimoto: ¥99,556,400
3. Ryu Shikun: ¥58,293,700
4. Kobayashi Satoru: ¥44,198,820
5. Takemiya Masaki: ¥31,449,100
6. Kato Masao: ¥30,124,520
7. Otake Hideo: ¥28,284,100
8. O Rissei: ¥28,211,800
9. Rin Kaiho: ¥27,235,020
10. Kataoka Satoshi: ¥25,935,400

Unlike the last list we published, for 1991 (in GW67, page 9), this one includes prize winnings from international tournaments, which explains why, for the first time, the number two player made almost 100 million yen. Yoda's total includes the \$400,000 he earned by winning the Samsung Cup.

Most wins (over 6-dan)

1. Yamada Kimio: 47-11
2. Kataoka Satoshi: 46-20

3. Cho Chikun: 45-17
4. Ryu Shikun: 40-24
5. Nakano Hironari: 38-15
O Meien: 38-16
7. Imamura Yoshiaki 8-dan: 35-15
Yo Kagen: 35-22
Rin Kaiho: 35-25
10. Cho Sonjin: 34-12
Kobayashi Koichi, Kato Masao: 34-14

Most wins (under 7-dan)

1. Hane Naoki 6-dan: 48-16
2. Cho U 4-dan: 46-9
3. Kato Atsushi 6-dan: 41-15
4. Takao Shinji 5-dan: 40-16
5. Yamashita Keigo 4-dan: 39-12

Best winning percentage (over 6-dan)

1. Yamada: 81.03%
2. Kamimura Kunio: 74.19% (23-8)
3. Cho Sonjin: 73.91%
4. Komatsu Hideki: 73.81% (31-11)
5. Hikosaka Naoto: 73.33% (33-12)
6. Cho Chikun: 72.58%
7. Mimura Tomoyasu 7-dan: 72.09% (31-12)
8. Nakano: 71.7%
9. Kobayashi Koichi, Kato: 70.83%

Best winning percentage (under 7-dan)

1. Cho U 4-dan: 83.64%
2. Yanaka Katsunori 5-dan: 82.22% (37-8)
3. Kim Shujun 2-dan: 76.92% (20-6)
4. Han Zenki 2-dan: 76.67% (23-7)
5. Yamashita Keigo 4-dan: 76.47%

Most successive wins (over 6-dan)

1. Muramatsu Ryuichi 7-dan: 15
2. Hane Uzumasa, Ishida Akira 9-dan, Hikosaka: 11
5. Cho Chikun, Yamashiro Hiroshi, Kamimura Kunio, O Meien, Morita Michihiro 8-dan, Yamada Kimio: 10

Most successive wins (under 7-dan)

1. Takao Shinji: 18
2. Yanaka: 17
3. Cho U: 14
4. Shimojima Yohei 3-dan: 11
5. Kono Rin 2-dan: 10

Appendix

The Cho-Kobayashi rivalry

Cho's recent successes in 'big three' titles have enabled him to surge ahead of his leading rival throughout his career, Kobayashi Koichi. In the last year, with Kobayashi titleless and Cho winning the 'triple crown', the latter has taken a decisive lead, but even so some of the statistics of their respective careers place them very close.

Total titles won

- 64: Sakata
- 48: Cho Chikun
- 44: Otake Hideo
- 42: Kobayashi Koichi
- 41: Kato Masao

Big three titles

Cho's 1997 Kisei was his 22nd 'big three' (best-of-seven, two-day games = Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo) win. This, of course, was a new record. Kobayashi is in second place with 16, followed by Rin Kaiho with 13.

Lifetime winning percentage

Here Cho is number one among all professionals who have played 1,000 games or more. His record is 68% exactly, but that is just barely ahead of Kobayashi on 67.9%.

Successive appearances in best-of-sevens

- Kobayashi: 11
- Cho: 6

Grand slam

Cho is the only player to have won all the current seven open titles. Kato has won six (he's missed out on the Kisei) and Kobayashi five (he's never won the Honinbo — four unsuccessful challenges to Cho — or the Oza).

Successive title wins

- 9: Takagawa x Honinbo
- 8: Cho x Honinbo (he'll be shooting for his ninth in a row this year), Kobayashi x Kisei, Kato x Oza
- 7: Sakata x Honinbo, Kobayashi x Meijin
- 6: Otake x Gosei, Kobayashi x Gosei

New from Yutopian

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Korean Tournaments

The 36th Top Position Title

Cho Hoon-hyun started out this best-of-five match with two straight wins, played on January 17 and February 3. It looked as if Cho was about to take back a major title from his disciple, but Lee Chang-ho fought back and won the third game on February 15. He then won the next two games to defend his title with a score of 3-2. We present Games Four and Five of this title match here.

Game Four

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 5 hours each.

Played on February 20, 1997.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). A smooth opening

Instead of the double approach move of 20, White could have made a large-scale move by jumping to 23.

The opening has progressed smoothly up to 33.

Playing Black 39 at A might have been a bit better.

After the sequence from 45 to 49, Black has come out of the opening with a slight advantage.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). A violent attack

Black jumps deep into White's sphere of influence with 59. White has no alternative but to counterattack with the moves from 60 on.

White stands at 74, giving up a stone in the lower right corner, to stop Black from making a moyo in the center. He then captures a stone at 76 and 78 to secure eyes for his group.

Severing White with Black 79 and 81 were violent moves. Black should have chosen a more peaceful way by simply jumping into White's territory with A.

White 84 seems to be right on the mark.

Black 85 at B would have been the proper move.

Black cuts off White's stones in the center with the sequence from 89 to 97, but White counterattacks with 98 and 100. The shape of Black's stones suddenly looks bad.

Figure 3 (101-200). White has the lead

After Black 1, White 2 and 4 are played in the correct order. Now Black doesn't have a good move.

With White 50, both players are jumping around the board from one place to another, but White is clearly in the lead.




Figure 3 (101-200)

27: at 13; 30: at 24; 33: at 13; 36: at 24




Figure 4 (201-252)

44: at the marked stone

Figure 4 (201-252). White wins by 2 1/2 points.

(Igo, May 1997. Translated by the editor)

Game Five

White: Lee Chang-ho

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun

Played on March 3, 1997.

Figure 1 (1-54). Creating aji in the corner

Both players are showing their power with Black 15 and White 16.

Before playing 22, White creates some aji

in the corner with 18 and 20.

Pushing with Black 31 to 37 enables White to get a wall facing the bottom. This creates a weakness for Black at A. It would have been better if Black had played at B with 31. After that Black could cap at 34 and the white stones on the right would be under attack. This way, Black would be able to naturally reinforce the weakness at A.




Figure 1 (1-54)

Figure 2 (55-100). White takes the lead.

Black got to play on the upper left side with 55 to 59, but White 60 was a severe invasion. White sacrificed the two stones at 60 and 62, but he took the lead when he secured profit at the bottom with 72.




Figure 2 (55-100)

Black 91 was a careless move. Black should have wedged in with A. If White then connected at 91, Black would draw back to B and he would have isolated the white stone to the left of A and taken profit in the center. When White plays 96, he has the better position.

Figure 3 (101–134). *A beautiful attack*

White 22 and 24 were beautiful moves. White 26 now decides the game. After White 34, the black stones in the upper left corner are dead, so Black is forced to resign.

Black resigns after White 134.

(NHK Igo Koza, May 1997. Translated by the editor.)




Figure 3 (101–134)

The 8th Kisung (Kisei) Title

The Korean Kisei title is the third most important Korean tournament with total prize money of 200,000,000 won (about \$230,000) and 25,000,000 won (about \$29,000) going to the winner. Like the Wang Wi (The King Position title) this title match is a best-of-seven series. This year's challenger was an up-and-coming player by the name of Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan. Lee started off the series with two straight wins on November 30 and December 10, 1996, so it seemed as if this would be another walk-over for him. But Choi came back and took the next two games on December 27 and January 12, forcing Lee to resign in both of them and evening the score. This must have given Lee a jolt because in the next two games he came back to show his superiority convincingly winning them on January 28 and February 10 and defending the title.

We present here the fourth game in which Ch'oe forced Lee to resign after 197 moves.

Game Four

White: Lee Chang-ho Kisei

Black: Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points; **time:** 5 hours each.

Played on January 12, 1997.

Figure 1 (1–50). *Black is satisfied.*

White went to a lot of trouble confining

Black to the corner with 44 and 46, but Black has no reason to feel dissatisfied with his result after playing 49.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 2 (51–100). *A severe fight*

If Black plays 74 at 79, the sequence Black A–White B–Black 74–White C–Black D–White E–Black F would follow. Black would capture the territory on the right, while White would get the black stones in the center.

Black invades at the 3–3 point with 83.

After White 86, a severe fight breaks out in the lower left.




Figure 2 (51-100)
50: at 40

Figure 3 (101-150). The losing move

White 8 was the losing move. White should have played this move at 17. If Black then cut at 8, White should atari at 47.

Against White 12, Black 13 was a good move. White is in trouble.

White tries to seal off the lower left with 40, aiming to attack the black stones in the upper left at A, but White didn't expect the tesuji of Black 41 and 43




Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 4 (151-197). A big exchange

Black connects the ko at 65, capturing the nine white stones on the lower left. White captures at 66, destroying the large piece of

territory Black has taken there. However, when Black lives in the upper left corner with 67 and 69, White has no chance to win.

Choi fought brilliantly in this game and evened the match two wins to two losses. Although he eventually lost this match, he is certain to become an important player in the Korean go world.

White resigns after Black 197.

(Igo, April 1997. Translated by the editor.)




Figure 4 (151-197)
60, 65: at the marked stone; 63: at 53



Lee Chang-ho: the top Korean player

The 1st Bacchus Cup —Tengen Title Match

The Bacchus Cup is an old title in Korea, dating back to 1983. This year it became the Tengen title and its numbering started over. It has a total of 100,000,000 won (\$115,000) in prize money, with 11,000,000 won (about \$12,700) going to the winner.

The title match was a best-of-five series and pitted Lee Chang-ho against Cho Hoon-hyun. After four games, the score was 2-2, so everything rested on the final game in which Cho resigned after 219 moves. Below is the first game of this match.

Game One

White: Cho Hoon-hyun

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 3 hours each

Played on October 25, 1996




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *Cho's favorite fuseki*

This seems to be Cho's favorite opening pattern. The moves to White 6 are the same as he played in Game Two of the Tong Yang Securities Cup against Kobayashi Satoru (see page 15).

Instead of 21, extending to Black A would be the normal move.

Instead of 34, extending to B makes more sense.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *The losing move*

White 52 was the losing move. If White peeped at A, Black would be in trouble. After Black plays 53 and 55, his group at the top left has two eyes.

Cho said that the extension to White 72 was too mild. He should have invaded the corner at 99 instead. White immediately defends with 73, and after White links up his stones to the one on the right side with 94, Black attacks with 95. White is in serious trouble.




Figure 3 (101-150)

10: at the marked stone; 33, 38: at 29; 36: at 30

Figure 3 (101–150). *White has a bad position.*

White takes some profit at the bottom with the sequence to 12, but he still has a bad game.

Black ignores White 48 and jumps into White's sphere of influence with 49.

Figure 4 (151–187). *White resigns.*

White should have played the sequence White A–Black B–White C–Black D earlier, but after Black 75, it's too late.

White resigns after Black 187.

(Igo, January 1997. Translated by the editor.)




Figure 4 (151–187)
61: at the marked stone

Chinese Tournaments

The 10th Tianyuan (Tengen) Tournament

This game is from the preliminary tournament to decide the challenger to the Tianyuan title holder, Ma Xiaochun, was played on January 18, 1997. The players were two young up-and-coming pros Zhou Heyang and Wang-Lei. Wang Lei was on the Chinese team in the 11th China–Japan Super Go Series (he lost to Hane Naoki) and both Wang and Zhou played in this year's Fujitsu Cup. Wang did not fare so well in the Fujitsu Cup, losing to O Meien 9-dan in the first round, but Zhou did very well, beating Choi Myung-hoon 5-dan in the first round, then beating Lee Chang-ho to make it into the quarterfinals.

This game featured a fierce fight which started in the lower left corner and spread throughout the board and Black found himself with three endangered groups. The situation was finally resolved when Black captured a group of White's.

White: Wang Lei 6-dan

Black: Zhou Heyang 6-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points.

Played on January 18, 1997




Figure 1 (1–48)

Figure 1 (1–48). *White approaches too closely.*

The pincer of White 16 is usually played one line farther away at 25.

Black 21 and 23 are excellent moves which punish White 16 for playing too close to Black's stone at 15.

Black 25 and 27 are strong moves. Black has taken an early lead when he ataris with 35.




Figure 2 (49-110)

Figure 2 (49-110). *A sharp clash at the bottom*

Black jumps into White's sphere of influence at the top with 55 in order to deny him territory there.

White 70 and 72 rob Black of his eyes, but White's shape is bad because his stones are short of liberties.

With the attachment of White 76, the fireworks begin. Neither side gives any quarter. Up to 100, White lives in the corner, while Black links up his stones at the bottom to the ones on the right.

Then, with 110, White launches a fierce attack against the black group in the center.

Figure 3 (111-205). *Three groups in danger*

After Black defends with 11, the fighting spreads to the upper left. Suddenly, Black finds himself with three endangered groups.

He plays 41 to make eyes for his group in the upper right corner, but now White cuts with 42 and Black captures with 43 and 45.

Since White is aiming at the sequence White A-Black B-White C-Black 57-White D-Black 71-White E, which deprives Black of his eye shape, Black must play 51.

White 56 is a tesuji that attacks the black group on the right and the one on the left.

Black 105 decides the game. If White connects at F, Black plays G and the white stones die.

White resigns after Black 205.

(NHK Igo Koza, May 1997. Translated by the editor.)




Figure 3 (111-205)

43, 76, 79, 82, 85: take ko
around the marked stone

The 3rd Monarch Tournament

The Game to Decide the Challenger

Although he lost the game above, Wang is not without his successes. This year he won the double elimination tournament in which the challenger to the Monarch title is decided. Wang won five straight games, while Chang came out on top in the losers' section, thus setting up the showdown in the game below.

(The Monarch title match is a best-of-seven match. Wang lost the first game by 3 3/4 points on February 17.)

White: Zhang Wendong 9-dan

Black: Wang Lei 6-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points.

Figure 1 (1–50). Black's unbending moves

You might think that Black 33 is overly defensive. However, it is superior to the alternatives of A, B, or C.

Black 45 and 47 are unbending moves, but they are dangerous. Black could also have at D with 45. White will play E and the sequence Black 46, White 45–Black F–White 47–Black G–White H–Black I. Black is satisfied. Black J is left behind and this is annoying to White.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 2 (51–100). Destroying aji

White should not have played 66 and 70 so soon. It would have been better to have left them for aji later on.

Instead of defending the corner with 92, White should have played the sequence A–Black B–White C. This would have defended against the invasion of Black 93.

Figure 4 (151–200). The losing moves

Before connecting at 60, White should have exchanged A for Black B.

White 76 and 80 were the losing moves. Instead of 76, White should have drawn back with 80. Next, if Black C, White plays 80. If Black then plays D, White still has a good game.

Figure 5 (201–250). The game is decided.

Capturing with Black 7 was big. When Black played this move, the game was decided.

Black wins by 7 1/2 points.

(Igo, May 1997. Translated by the editor.)




Figure 2 (51–100)




Figure 3 (151–200)

32, 38, 44, 50: take ko at 24;

35, 41, 47: take ko at 23




Figure 4 (151–200)

56: takes ko at the marked stone




Figure 5 (201–250)

31: at the marked stone; 33, 41, 47: take ko at 13;
34: takes ko at 28; 38, 44, 50: take ko at 16




Figure 6 (251–316)

56, 62, 68: at the white triangled stone;
59, 65, 106: at 53;
78, 84, 115: at the squared stone;
81, 87: at 75; 113: at 100

The 9th Mingren (Meijin) Title Match

The Mingren title is decided by a best-of-five match. Ma has held this title for seven terms so far, but he encountered a stiff challenge from Liu Xiaoguang, who is one of China's top players. The match went the full distance, with Ma prevailing by a score of three wins to two losses. Ma has now held this title for eight consecutive terms

Game Five

White: Ma Xiaochun Mingren

Black: Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2 points

Played on October 24, 1996 in Beijing.

Figure 1 (1–50). Lukewarm moves by Black

According to Ma, instead of connecting at 25, it would have been better to play 1 in *Dia. 1* (next page). After the sequence to 7, Black is thick. If White next plays at 8, Black can launch an attack against the white stones on the right side.

Instead of cutting at 47, Black should draw back with 1 in *Dia. 2*. The idea behind this move is that after Black jumps to 17, the marked stone inhibits the development of the white stones on the left side. Moreover, the white stones above still don't have eyes and can be attacked.

Figure 2 (51–100). An important forcing move

White slid to 53 in answer to White 52. However, White cuts the black stones off from the center with 54 and 56. Black cuts at 63 to





Figure 1 (1–50)

make sabaki, but White 64 takes away his eye shape.



Playing the forcing move of White 84 is important. If White neglects to play this move and descends to 86 instead, Black will play the sequence Black A–White B–Black C–White D. Next Black can rescue his two stones at the top by playing at E and it will be a hard fight for White.

Instead of 97, the sequence Black F–White G–Black H, leading to a ko, was considered, but the result would not be good for Black.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 3 (101–151). An under the-stones tesuji

With the sequence from 6 to 14, White has taken the lead.

After Black 37, even if White plays elsewhere, his stones at the bottom are alive. For example, if Black jumps into White's area with A, White will connect at B and Black will connect at C. Next, Black captures six white stones with the sequence White D–Black E–White 19–Black F–White G–Black H, but now White plays at the marked stone and captures three black stones with an under-the-stones tesuji.




Figure 3 (101–151)
23: at 11




Figure 4 (151–200)




Figure 5 (200-235)
33: at the marked stone; 35: at 8

Figure 5 (200-235). *White wins*

The game ended when Black connected with 235. White had such a big lead that the game wasn't counted.

(Igo, April 1997. Translated by the editor.)

International Tournaments

The 8th Tong Yang Securities Cup Final

Cho Hoon-hyun v. Kobayashi Satoru

It looked as if this year's Tong Yang Securities Cup was going to be a complete disaster for the Nihon Ki-in pros. Only Kobayashi Satoru, the former Japanese Kisei and Gosei, managed to make it into the semifinals. Kobayashi Koichi (lost to Ma Xiaochun), Kato Masao (lost to Lee Chang-ho), O Rissei (lost to Cho Hoon-hyun), and Takemiya Masaki (lost to Wang Lei 6-dan of China) were unable to make it even into the quarterfinals. Ryu Shikun did make it, but he lost to a lowly Korean 4-dan Kim Young-hwan. Taking a break from their Kisei rivalry, Kobayashi Satoru and Cho Chikun were paired in the quarterfinals, so at least one Nihon Ki-in player was guaranteed to make it into the semifinals. With two other Koreans, Lee Chang-ho (defeated Ma) and Cho Hoon-hyun (defeated Wang Lei) in the quarterfinals, Kobayashi seemed to be outnumbered and most Japanese fans gave up hope of a Japanese taking this title or even getting into the finals, especially since Kobayashi's opponent was the

nearly invincible Lee Chang-ho. But Kobayashi came through and did what nobody expected, defeating Lee in their semifinal game. When the veteran Korean player Cho Hoon-hyun beat his compatriot Kim Young-Hwan, a showdown between Japan and Korea was set up.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Cho Hoon-hyun

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time 3 hours each.

Played on March 31, 1997 in Seoul, Korea.

Figure 1 (1-50). *Influence for territory*

When White plays 46, he gives up his four stones at the bottom. As compensation, he gets influence in the center and confines Black's stone at 3 to the corner

Figure 2 (51-100). *Cho's hallucination*

Cho seems to have hallucinated when he

played 77. He didn't see that Black 78 and 80 set up a capturing race between the black and white groups on the left side and White wins this race by one move. Suddenly, White has taken a big lead.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 3 (101-159). *Throwing the game away*

After White captured the black stones on the left side, it was hard to see how he could lose. But for some reason, Kobayashi got fixated on the lower right corner and played White 58. This was the losing move. If White had simply made a bamboo joint by playing 58 above 45, linking up his stones, he would have easily won.




Figure 3 (101-159)




Figure 4 (159-230)

Figure 4 (159-230). *Black wins by 6 1/2 points.*

Everyone was amazed at Kobayashi's blunder. The Korean newspapers went into a frenzy and the headline writers had a field day. Here are some samples of the copy they produced:

Cho Brought Back to Life

*Cho Saved from
the Jaws of Death*

The Great Upset

Game Two

White: Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan
Black: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan
Played on April 2, 1997 in Seoul, Korea.

Figure 1 (1–50). A good opening for Black

The bump of White 30 and the jump to 32 were criticized by some of the pros analyzing the game in the press room. White does cut through with 32 and 34, but the usual sequence is for White to simply push up with 30 at 34; then after Black blocks at 35, White hanes at 32.




Figure 1 (1–50)




Figure 2 (51–100)
82: takes ko at 10

Figure 2 (51–100). A surprising move

The knight's move of Black 53 was a good point. Everyone following the game in the press room agreed that Kobayashi was playing well.

White 54 was a defiant move. Black answered by bumping against the white stone at 40 with 55, but, according to one Korean professional watching, Black should have defended his corner by forcing with the sequence Black 65–White 77–Black 75–White 76 instead.

Invading the corner with White 58 was big. After this the clamp of 66, followed by the cut of 68, were superb moves. They enabled White to link up with the sequence to 78. Next, White was able to capture a stone with 80 and 82, forcing Black to defend with 81 and 83.

Black 91 and 93 were probing moves. White's cut at 94 was surprising. Black can respond with the sequence Black A–White B–Black C, splitting up White's positions above and below, so it was not expected that White would play this move. However, Cho thought about this move for 18 minutes, the longest time taken for any move in this game, so he must not have thought it to be much of a danger.




Figure 3 (101–144)

40: takes ko (below 37); 42: connects (at 37)

Figure 3 (101–144). Black's corner group dies

From 86 to 108 (8 in this figure), White secured his group in the center, then switched to the upper right corner and attacked the

black group there.

After White 12, Black played 13 in the center. Cho then took this opportunity to cut off Black's four stones in the corner with the sequence to 28. Note the cutting tesuji of 22.

When Black captures with 25 and 27, he has become thick in the center, so he follows up his move at 13 by attacking the white group in the center with 29.

Black thought for 17 minutes before playing 31. White responded with 32, then Kobayashi was able to force White to fight a ko for the life of his group with the sequence from Black 33 to 37.

Black played his ko threat at 41, but White ended the ko by connecting at 42, linking up his group to his stones on the right side. Black connects at 43, hoping to set up a capturing race for the black and white stones on the upper right side.

White 44 was a good move which denied the black group two eyes.




Figure 4 (144-236)

Figure 4 (145-236). *The black group dies.*

When Black plays 69, there is still a chance of this semeai being decided over a ko, but after 73, White descends to 74, threatening to link up with his allies below. When Black blocks this link-up with 79 and 81, White descends to 82 and the black group in the corner is dead.

Instead of the ko threat of 41, Black should have played at 45 on the left side and it would have still been difficult game for both sides.

Kobayashi continued to struggle on with Black 45. He wiped out White's territory on the left, but in the process his own group in the center became thin.

Black resigns after White 236.

(Go Weekly, April 21, 1997. Translated by the editor.)

Game Three of this match will be presented in the next issue.

Kobayashi vs. Lee

Losing three straight games to Cho must have been a big blow to Kobayashi's pride as well as a disappointment to his Japanese fans. Of course Kobayashi offered no excuses for his miserable performance, but Japanese journalist were quick to point out that he had an extremely busy schedule in January and February. He had challenged Cho for the Kisei title and had worked his way up to the final in the 16th NEC Cup, where he lost to Kato Masao.

The constant pressure of traveling and weekly games must have taken their toll and he seemed to lose his concentration during the crucial points of his games with Cho.

Still, no one can deny Kobayashi's strength. Even though he lost three straight games, with a bit of luck, the match could have gone the other way. Moreover, in the semifinals, he proved that he is no pushover by beating Lee Chang-ho.

At first, it looked as if Lee, whose nickname in Korea is 'The Tank', was going to roll right over Kobayashi. But just when one of Kobayashi's groups seemed to be dead, he played a brilliant move and turned the tables on Lee.

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Lee Chang-ho

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 3 hours each.

Played on March 9, 1997 in Seoul, Korea.

Figure 1 (1-50). *Lee Chang-ho style*

What about Black 13? Since White was able to play the sequence from 14 to 18 in sente, then come back and pincer with 20, it lacked severity.

Black 25 was a tight move, storing up

power to attack later on. When White pressed with 26, Black cut through with 27 and 29. This sequence is typical of Lee's style.

Black peeps with 37, then cuts with 39, going after the white stones at the bottom. The moves to Black 53 went according to Lee's reading.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 2 (51-100). Kobayashi's brilliant move

When Black blocked at 53, the consensus was that White would lose his stones. If White answered Black 53 with 58, Black would destroy White's eye shape with A, and Black would win the capturing race by one move. But Kobayashi had the brilliant move of White 54 up his sleeve. If Black answers by drawing back at 56, then it would be White who wins the capturing race. As a result Black had to backtrack and make life for his group with 55 and 59. After this, living with 60 and 62 was very big.

On the other hand, Black has almost no territory; his groups have only managed to live. Without a doubt, White has a won game.

White 66 to 74 are steady moves, ensuring White's victory.

Aware that he is ahead, White attaches at 78, so as to settle the shape of his stones in the center.

Figure 3 (101-202). No hope of an upset

Lee's skill at the endgame is unrivaled, but even he couldn't pull off an upset in this position.




Figure 2 (51-100)




Figure 3 (101-202)

Black resigns after White 202.

(NHK Igo Koza, May 1997. Translated by the editor.)

New Software from Yutopian

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Everyone would like to get strong in a hurry, but we constantly hear people say: 'I am so busy, I don't have time to play.' 'I don't have money to take lessons from professionals.' 'I know the best way to get strong is to replay professional games (as preached by Cho Chikun), but it's so boring.'

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The 21st Meijin Title Match

In our last issue, we presented the first four games of last year's Meijin title match between Cho and Takemiya. In this issue we continue our coverage with commentaries on games five and six. Cho is leading 3-1.

Game Five

White: Takemiya Masaki Meijin


Black: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time 8 hours each

Played on October 23-24, 1996 in Tokyo.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho.

Takemiya was at *kadoban*; that is, he would lose the match if he lost another game. For that reason he probably made a special effort and he played a superb game, utilizing thickness as only Takemiya can. Unlike the first four games, which were all one-sided and ended quickly, this game was a cliff-hanger from start to finish. It was hard to tell who was going to win. Both players played the kind of go they liked best, with Cho going for territory and Takemiya for thickness.



Reference Diagram

The reference diagram shows the high-light of the game. When Takemiya attached at 1, Cho ignored it and took territory at the bottom with 2. But why didn't he play at 'a' instead? Another point I wondered about was how Takemiya planned to respond if Black had played 'a'.





Figure 1 (1-29)

Figure 1 (1-29). Playing their own styles

In this fuseki, White 8 was not a typical Takemiya move. I have never seen him play such a move.


Cho occasionally plays the *sanren-sei*. However, unlike most players, Cho wants his opponent to enter inside this formation, so he will tempt them to do this by playing big points elsewhere on the board. When Takemiya plays the *sanren-sei*, he keeps expanding it until he has made a huge moyo. Cho likes to invade at the 3-3 point, while Takemiya likes his opponents to invade his moyo at the 3-3 point. On the other hand, Cho doesn't like his opponents to invade his moyos at the 3-3 point. As you can see, their styles are completely opposite.



Dia. 1


The turning point of this opening arrived after White 10. If Black wanted to build a moyo, he would play at 1, 'a', or 'b' in Dia. 1.

If White makes a sanren-sei with 2, Black would jump to 3. This is one idea.



Dia. 2

Black 13 and 15 were a bit greedy. If White 10 were not present, they would be reasonable moves. In response to White 12, Black 1 in *Dia. 2* is the usual move. If White invades with 2, Black builds a moyo up to 13. But, as I said above, Cho doesn't like his corners to be invaded.



Dia. 3

When Black played 17 and pushes up with 23 and 25, the power of Black's sanren-sei had been diminished. If Cho had placed more value on it, he would have pushed at 1 in *Dia. 3*, followed by 3. This would be more in keeping with a natural sanren-sei strategy. Later, Black could exchange 'a' for White 'b'. He could then look forward to playing the hane and connection beginning with 'c'.

Instead of 23, the knight's move of Black A is more conventional, but Cho being Cho, he went all-out by pushing with 23 and 25.

Figure 2 (29–59). *Black is not so good.*

Apparently, Black pushed up with 23 and 25 in preparation for the invasion at 29, but White's thickness facing the right reduced the influence of the sanren-sei, while Black's thickness was diminished by the marked

stone. I would never have settled for such a bad position. I felt that something was amiss in Cho's strategy. Instead of invading with 29, I would think that Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4* are more reasonable. White still has weaknesses. For example, Black could invade at 'a', 'b', or 'c'.






Figure 2 (29–59)




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

In *Dia. 5*, if 'a' had not been played, everybody would agree that the invasion of Black 1 up to White 12, where White ends in gote, would be good for Black. In the game, the marked stone substitutes for White 12, so White can take sente and switch to the center, turning at 40; this is a big move.

White 42 was right on the mark. Playing more aggressively with 1 in *Dia. 6* would have been risky: Black could escape with 2 and 4.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Black 43 and 45 were shrewd moves, enabling Black to quickly switch to 47. However, even better than 45 would be to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. In the game, White was able to make good shape with 58. Once this move was made, the point at A was no longer urgent for either side.




Figure 3 (60-78)


Figure 3 (60-78). Refusal to follow orders

In response to 60, Black didn't submissively answer at 63; instead, he jumped to 61. If he had immediately played 63, White would have attached at B. Takemiya probably expected 61, so 62 was the move he intended to play anyway.


When White attached with 64, Cho had a hard time deciding whether to play 65 or 66. White 68 is a tight territorial move, but since

Black had played 65 and was aiming at C, White played tightly. White 68 indirectly defended against the invasion at C, so it could not be faulted.

If White had played 62 at 1 in *Dia. 8*, he would have captured the marked stone, but since White's territory is open on the lower left, this would not be a good strategy.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9

Instead of 63, Black might also slide to 1 in *Dia. 9*, but this is not good for him because White would play 2. After White 10, the wedge at 'a' remains.



Dia. 10

Another reason 68 is good is that if White can cap at 'a' in *Dia. 10* later in the game, White 1 is a frightening threat. Black can live, but after 3 and 5, there is some bad aji in the lower left corner. White 7 and 9 destroy Black's eye

shape. (If Black 10 at 12 in answer to White 9, White plays 14. If Black 'b', White 'c'.) Of course, Black can live as long as he has 10 in reserve, but if this move should disappear, Black's stones would die. Since Black's stones at the bottom are still weak, a move like White 'd' could be a deadly threat against both the black corner group and the one on the right.

Black seemed to have his heart set on invading at C, so he was reluctant to jump to D. However, I think it is like beating a dead horse. I would simply abandon this invasion and exchange Black D for White C.

White would invade at 82, breaking up Black's sanren-sei formation. In order to prevent White from invading at C, Cho played 79. After the forcing move of 80, Takemiya invades at 82.

If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 11* to prevent the invasion on the side, White will invade the corner. (This has become like an instruction game played with a weak player. It should be easy for White to win.) The moves 83 and 85 are not moves I would recommend readers to imitate — they are bad style, to be played in emergencies.






Figure 4 (78-103)



Dia. 12



Dia. 11

Figure 4 (78-103). Black invades.


White 78 was a steady move; Black had no good response. If Black A, White B. If Black 80,

Instead of 89, Black 1 in *Dia. 12* is the bigger move, but, if White were to play 2 and 4, the bad aji shown in *Dia. 10* would suddenly spring to life. Of course, Black still has a way out with 'a', but if White plays 'b', then 'c', 'd', and 'e' will become threats against the black groups on the upper left side and at the bottom as well.

Black ignored 90 and played his long-awaited invasion at 91. Up to now, White seemed to be in the lead, but when Cho invaded, the game was thrown into confusion.

Takemiya didn't expect Cho to ignore White 90. White is threatening to jump to D, making miai of E and F. However, Cho couldn't let this chance escape, for it was his last hope of winning.

Instead of 90, Takemiya should have played 1 in *Dia. 13*. Even if Black plays 2, 4 and 5 become miai; that is, if Black 5, White 'a'.



Dia. 13





Figure 5 (104-119)



Dia. 14


Figure 5 (104-119). Unbelievable moves

Up to 103 in the preceding figure, Black succeeded in living in the upper left corner.

White then played on the right side and cut off two stones with the sequence from 4 to 8. It's hard to say if this was good or bad because the game became so unpredictable. I wonder how the players felt about their positions.

At this point, an unbelievable pair of moves occurred: White 16 and Black 17.

Why didn't Black come out with A in answer to White 16? If Black played at 1 in Dia. 14, he could start a ko fight with 11. He has a lot of ko threats around 'a' and he also has a lot of threats around 'b', so he would win this ko and capture some white stones in the top left. I wonder if Takemiya had a good response to Black 1 in Dia. 14.



Dia. 15

Another possibility for Black was 1 in Dia. 15. Black would end in sente with the sequence from 1 to 5. He could then play 7, which is much bigger than 17 in the figure.

What was Takemiya's reason for playing 16? Takemiya was probably afraid that without 16, Black would attach at B and erase White's moyo. But if Black then plays A, White C-Black D follow and White loses a lot, so even though he gets sente, he probably couldn't play this way. In any case, Black 17 was an unbelievable move. just as points go, Black E is surely bigger than 17, but, more important than all this, why didn't Black leap at the chance to play A? By giving White the chance to play 18, Cho let slip a big chance.

Figure 6 (120-153). White takes the lead.

White next played the hane and connection of 20 and 22. He is now threatening to clamp at A, which would destroy the Black's eye shape.






Figure 6 (120-153)



Dia. 16

Instead of blocking with 21, Black should have cut with 1 in *Dia. 16*, then jumped to 3. White would capture with 4 and Black could atari with 11 and 13 after playing the forcing moves from 5 to 9. Now he doesn't have to worry about eyes for his group and he could connect at 15. After White blocks at 16, Black will descend to 17. If White next isolates the black group on the left side with 20, Black lives with 21 and 23. This seems to be the best Black can do, but I still can't tell who would win. It would be a close game, maybe a half-point victory for either side. In any case, there is no doubt it would have made a big difference if Black had played 17 in the previous figure at 22 in *Figure 6*.



Dia. 17

By playing 23 to 25, Black can get an eye at B or 43 in *gote*, but Black shouldn't feel good about this result. If Black doesn't exchange 39 for 40, he can omit 43. White makes a five-space dead eye shape with 1 to 7 in *Dia. 17*, but Black could play 'a' — White must answer at 'b' — then make his second eye at 'c'.

Black answered 44 with the sequence from 45 to 51. He then switched to the top with 53, leaving his group on the left without two eyes. This is a big life-and-death problem. Don't look at the answer; can you kill the black stones on the left side?





Figure 7 (154-166)

Figure 7 (154-166). *Takemiya survives.*

The key moves are 54 and the hane of 56. Black is dead! Playing the marked stone at the

top was unreasonable because Black had to make another move to defend his group. However, Black did not have enough territory to win, so he had to take a chance and play the marked stone. *Dia. 18* shows another variation where White kills Black.



Dia. 18

Black resigns after White 166.

(Kido, December 1996. Translated by the editor.)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun Kisei, Honinbo

Black: Takemiya Masaki Meijin

Played on November 6–7, 1996 in Shizuoka.

Commentary by Cho Chikun.





Figure 1 (1–23)


Figure 1 (1–23). Tight moves expand moyos.

When Takemiya plays the sanren-sei, you have to expect that he will respond with a diagonal move above the approach move. In fact, he played two diagonal moves in one of the games of this match. This time I decided to play 10 and see what would happen.

In the previous games, Takemiya proved that Black 4 in *Dia. 1* is a good move, so I had no intention of letting him play it in this game.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Instead of 10, the knight's move of White 1 in *Dia. 2* could be answered by Black 2. Takemiya, however, would probably have pincer at 'a'. I didn't like the result in either case because it would be hard for White to invade the corner at 'b'. After Black blocks from the left, the two white stones would come under attack. I felt that 10 would make it easier to invade, then, if necessary, to make light of the stone at 8. Black can force at A any time he wants, but then I would just let Black make his moyo and I'd take territory.

Black 11 leaves his options open to play either for territory or for a moyo. If White immediately responds to 11 with 18, Black would definitely go for a moyo with A. That's why I answered Black 11 by attaching at 12.


I thought that 19 was a good move. It's narrow, but thick. White is now reluctant to extend to B. Someone suggested Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3* (next page), but Black is a bit thin and it would be risky for Black to expand his moyo with this weakness in the background.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5





Figure 2 (24-48)


Figure 2 (24-48). *Playing our own styles*

White invaded the corner with 24. Up to 32, White has come out better locally. Playing 31 meant that Black wanted sente so he could play 33. Therefore, he was content to let White play 32. Against White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*, Black would play 2 and 4. After 6, Black's moyo would be big.

The difference between the sequence in the game and the one in *Dia. 5* is that in the game there is some aji at A, but in *Dia. 5*, there is a cut at 'b' which renders White 'a' ineffective. On the other hand, White's territory at the bottom is more secure than in the game because the presence of Black 29 leaves some bad aji for White.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7


If Black rushes to play 1 in *Dia. 6*, without playing 29 and 31, White would play 2 and 4. No matter where Black blocks the ladder, White would extend to 'a' and take a big profit at the bottom.

Black reinforces his moyo with 33. White has made some profit in the lower right corner, so he can now think of playing lightly at 'a' or 'b' in *Dia. 7*; he could even play tightly at 'd'. White 'c' would not be good, however, because it doesn't remove the bad aji of the black cutting stone (29 in the figure).


After Black 33, White invaded deeply at 34 and Black capped at 35.

I next played 36. I also considered attaching at 1 in *Dia. 8*, but I didn't like the result to

12. Moreover, Black 10 seals off the right side, making it almost impregnable. Therefore, I decided to play 36.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Black 37 was the sealed move. After 38, Black played 39 to build up his moyo.

At first I intended to slide to 1 and extend to 3 in *Dia. 9*, but now, with the presence of the two marked stones along with 2 and 4 (or 4 at 'a'), Black's influence on the outside would be too great. Also, I couldn't be sure of getting two eyes by playing 'c' in response to Black 'b'. Therefore, I decided to continue with White 40 to 46, which made my group secure and gave me some territory at the top.

Instead of 40, if I continued by simply attaching at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White would end up with a bad position after the sequence to 8. Black would get both thickness and territory on the right and the white stones still don't have eyes.



Dia. 10

Instead of 41, Black could also have extended to B.

After Black expands his moyo with 47, I invaded at 48 as a probe.





Figure 3 (49-77)

Figure 3 (49-77). A hard game for White


Without answering White 48, Black switched to the bottom, exploiting the aji with the attachment of 49.




Dia. 11

If Black played at 1 in *Dia. 11*, White could play 2 and 4 and live with a ko. If Black 1 at 'a', White would peep at 'b'. If Black plays on the other side with 1 at 2, White would play the sequence White 1-Black 'b'-White 'c', again starting a ko fight.

Black didn't have a good move in the upper right, so he decided to build up strength at the bottom. Black 55 was an excellent move. It casts a net far from where the fight is going to start and lies in wait to catch the white stone in the upper right when it makes its dash to freedom.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

How is White going to escape? If he jumps out into the center with 1 in *Dia. 12*, Black makes him heavy with the peep of 2, followed by 4. Black could also play 2 and 4 in *Dia. 13*. Exchanging 'a' for 'b' is meaningless. Actually, this diagram is better for Black because in *Dia. 12* Black could slide down the right side where there is some potential for making an eye.

White tries to make a base for his group with 56 and 58, but White responds strongly with 57 and 59.


Black played 59 not because he was concerned so much about the corner territory; rather, he wanted to attack all the white stones on the right.

Still, I felt that I would have no trouble living with my group after I played 60 and 62, but Takemiya launched a tremendous attack with 63 and 65 after defending against the peep at A with 61. I didn't think there was a chance of it dying, but Takemiya went after it and, step by step, its chances of living began to look slimmer and slimmer. Then, when Takemiya played Black 77, I thought my group would die.



Dia. 14

Instead of Black 65, it might appear that Black 1 in *Dia. 14* is the vital point, but after the sequence to Black 5 it becomes apparent that the stone at 1 is misplaced and should be at 'a'.



Dia. 15

I intended to play at 77 after 74 and 76. I thought Takemiya would answer the sequence White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' with Black 'd' in *Dia. 15*. This would have given me more ko threats in the ko that results from White 1 to 9 (White gets two eyes if he wins the ko). But instead of answering 76, Takemiya immediately played Black 77. This was another great move.





Figure 4 (77-100)

Figure 4 (77-100). Would I have found the right move?

If White had been able to play at 77, Black would connect at A. Then, if White 99, Black would peep at 98.




Dia. 16

Against White 78, Black plays 79 and 81, preventing White from linking up to the bottom. Instead of 83 Black should have exchanged of 2 for White 3 in Dia. 16, then hane with 4. After Black 6, the white stones are captured. Therefore, White would have to ignore Black 2 and escape into the center with 4.

If White hane at 1 in Dia. 17 it was 'shown' after the game that the cut of Black 2 succeeds


in capturing the white stones, but later I found that I could play 3 and 5, and the long sequence to White 27 saves my stones. However, I wonder if I would I have seen this sequence, considering that I was in byoyomi and had only one minute for each move.




Dia. 17

10: connects (at 3); 22: at 20

Black 2 to 12 in Dia. 18 are a variation where I would have been able to save half of my stones. Later I could play 'a', forcing Black to make a move in the corner to live, but then I would have a good endgame move down the right side.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

Figure 5 (101-134). A lucky win

The cut of White 10 starts a ko. If Black wants to avoid this ko, he must play 1 in Dia. 19 after White 100 in the Figure 4. Still, White gets two eyes with the sequence from 2 to 10. Black runs out of ko threats, so he connects the ko with 25, but White then links up to his stones in the corner with the sequence to 34.




Figure 5 (101-134)

14, 17, 20, 23: take ko (around 11);
25: connects the ko (above 11)

Figure 6 (135-208). A hard-fought game

With the moves from Black 59 to 65 in Figure 3, Takemiya launched a brilliant attack against my stones stranded in the midst of his moyo. Each move was like a tremendous body blow and at one point I was unsure whether or not I could win.




Figure 6 (135-208)

Black resigns after White 208.

(Igo Club, January 1997. Translated by the editor.)

With this win, Cho clinched the match and the Meijin title. Now, for the second time in his career, he holds the top three Japanese titles. No other player has accomplished this feat even once. Kobayashi Koichi came close in 1990, 1991, and 1992, when he challenged Cho for the Honinbo title while holding the Kisei and Meijin titles, but each time he failed. Cho is also the most successful best-of-seven match player. With this match, he has played in 25 best-of-seven matches and has lost only four times (twice to Kobayashi Koichi, once to Rin Kaiho and once to Kobayashi Satoru). In February this year he successfully defended his Kisei title against Kobayashi Satoru, extending this record to 26 matches and 22 wins (see next article). Cho's nearest rival is Kobayashi Koichi with 16 wins to seven losses. Cho is clearly on a roll, and unless Kobayashi can regain his previous form, it seems that he has no chance of catching up with Cho. Cho's next milestone will be setting a record for the number of consecutive defenses of the Honinbo title. This year he has a chance to draw level with Takagawa's record of nine consecutive wins. In May he faces Kato Masao as the challenger. Kato challenged Cho two years ago for this title and lost, so Cho is favored to win the upcoming match and keep his Triple Crown.

The 21st Kisei Title Match

Cho Chikun vs. Kobayashi Satoru

For the third year in a row, the Kisei title was contested between Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Satoru. In their first encounter two years ago, Cho had underestimated Satoru's strength and he lost the series 2-4. The following year, they went down to the wire; the last game was a cliff-hanger, but Cho prevailed and took the series four wins to three losses. This year, however, was a rather one-sided affair. Cho seemed to have taken the measure of his opponent and quickly dispatched Satoru with four wins to one loss.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Satoru, 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Komi: 5 1/2 points; time: 8 hours each

Played on January 15-16, 1997 in Hawaii.

Commentary by Yoda Norimoto, Judan

try playing for territory in this game, perhaps because his opponent was Cho.




Figure 2 (20-29)





Figure 1 (1-19)

Figure 1 (1-19), Figure 2 (20-29). Kobayashi switches styles.

White 20 was a strange move for Kobayashi. His usual style calls for *Dia. 1*, where White 1 to 7 build an excellent formation, despite the slightly odd position of the marked stone. White can invade at 'a' later. Kobayashi must have deliberately decided to



Dia. 1

Figure 3 (30-41). The problem of White 36

The main point in this figure is that White should never have played 36. He had lots of ways to avoid making this move. First, since he had already played the marked stone at the top, he could have played 30 at A to help his position at the bottom. Then when Black played 31, threatening Black B, White could have extended to 1 in *Dia. 2*. Black will continue at 2, but that gives White a good excuse

to play 3 to 11, not necessarily immediately, but perhaps later, so White had no reason to fear Black 2. The marked white stone in *Dia. 2* is hard to kill.





Figure 3 (30-41)


Now we come to the offending move at White 36 itself, which let Black play the good extension at 37. The continuation at White 38 was neatly and unexpectedly dodged by Black 39. Black then defended at 41, leaving White in debt because of the sequence Black C-White D-Black E.




Dia. 2

I think White can play 36 at 1 in *Dia. 3*. If Black replies at 2, White can play 3 and 5, then invade at 7. He still has 'a' remaining on the right side. If Black plays 2 in *Dia. 4*, White plays 3 and 5, then extends to 7, giving up two

stones but preventing Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 4 (42-67). White gets into trouble.

All these matches with Cho may have done something to Kobayashi's style. He had no reason to get himself into trouble by invading at 42. He should have jumped to White 1 in *Dia. 5*. If Black replies at 'a', White attacks the marked black stone with 'b'. If Black plays 2 and 4 to prevent that, White 5 limits Black's prospects in the top right. Since White's marked stone was isolated and White was still in debt at 'c', he was in no position to invade at 'd'. After invading there (White 42), he had to make a series of wretched moves, starting with White 44. White wanted to play A, but Black would answer at 45.






Figure 4 (42-67)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black 59 put White in a terrible position, because if he connected at B, Black would play C.

White 62 was too miserable for words. White might have done better to play 50 at 1 in *Dia. 6*. After White 3 and 5, White may not have a good position, but at least he has some chance of stirring up trouble in Black's corner.




Figure 5 (68-79)

Figure 5 (68-79). White fails to fight back.

Black 71 was brilliant. After containing White with 73 and the rest, Black had a sure-win position. This was too much for White to bear. If White was going to lose anyway, he should have fought back by playing 72 at 73.





Figure 6 (80-87)

Figure 6 (80–87). *No hope*

By now, White's situation was almost hopeless. Kobayashi was playing what may go down as the worst game in his career. Black A would have threatened Black B, so White 80 and 82 were very big.

Could White have invaded the top right corner?

No, White C fails because of *Dia. 7*, and White D because of *Dia. 8*.



Next, Black could have won the game by playing E, but Cho decided to attack at 83. White lived in sente with 84 and 86, but Cho was willing to accept gote because 85 and 87 strengthened his corner and center. Black 85 was necessary to prevent White D.




Figure 7 (88–100)

Figure 7 (88–100). *No great success*

The idea behind Black 89 was that if White plays A, Black takes sente with B. White therefore played 90, threatening B, but Cho was prepared for this. The result through 100 was no great success for White.

Figure 8 (101–127). *Black moves in for the finish.*

When Black came to collect his debt at 3, White made a belated counterattack at 4. White 12 threatened to cut at A, but that gave Black a perfect opportunity to cut at 15 before defending at 17, isolating White's center stones. White had little hope of saving all of them.





Figure 8 (101–127)



Dia. 9

If White uses 22 to connect at 1 in *Dia. 9*, Black can capture White's upper center group with 2 to 12, or capture the lower center group by playing 4 at 5, followed by White 4 and Black 6. The marked black group at the top is not so easy to kill.



Cho and Satoru analyzing the first game with Otake, Michael Redmond, and Kobayashi Koichi looking on.

Figure 9 (128–145). White resigns.

Once Black captured two stones with 35 and 37, he had no more worries. White could play a big move at 42, but Black could do the same at 38. Kobayashi resigned on seeing Black 45. If he had continued by playing 1 in *Dia. 10* to save his group, Black would connect at 2, forcing White 3, then play 4, threatening 'a' and 'b', so White would lose the marked stones. You don't need to count to tell who has won.

White resigns after Black 145.

(Abridged from *Kido*, March 1997. Translated by James Davies.)





Figure 9 (128–145)



Dia. 10

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei
Black: Kobayashi Satoru, 9-dan
Played on January 29–30, 1997.

Figure 1 (1–16). Long thought

Cho thought for a long time about White 12. Both players agreed later that White 1 in *Dia. 1* was out of the question, because that diagram leaves White no good way to defend against possible black invasions at 'a' to 'd'.




Figure 1 (1-16)






Figure 2 (17-29)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (17-29). Kobayashi's second thoughts

Black 17 is a move that Kobayashi often plays, but here it got him into difficulties. After 18 to 22, White threatened A, and White's marked stone was looking good. Kobayashi said he should have played 17 at B. He also said that he had wanted to play Black 25 at 1 in Dia. 2. After Black 1 and 3, Black 5 threatens both Black 'a' and an invasion of the upper side. Apparently he was afraid Cho would play some move other than White 2 or 4, but Dia. 2 still looks better than Black 25.



Kobayashi Satoru





Figure 3 (30-52)

Figure 3 (30-52). Ahead in territory and power

White played 30, instead of 32, to keep Black from linking up with 8 in *Dia. 3*. It would have been natural for Black to answer White 30 at 37, but White A would have taken more profit than Black 37. Black played 37 a few moves later, so as to leave B for use after Black 43, but Black 37 and 39 also strengthened White's position.




Dia. 3

White answered Black 43 peacefully at 44, but he could have played for a ko exchange as in *Dia. 4*. The exchange is in White's favor, because White 13 kills the top group and White 19 saves the bottom left. Black will look for a variation somewhere, but he lacks ko threats. Cho probably chose the peaceful course because he was already leading in both territory and power.

Figure 4 (53-92). Surprising moves by White

White 54 came as a surprise to the people following the game, who were expecting White A. Kobayashi commented that having secured his own position with Black 57 to 63, he should have played Black 65 at 1 in *Dia. 5*. Then the threat of Black 'a' might have materialized.



Dia. 4






Figure 4 (53-92)




Dia. 5

Black 65 caused White to go wrong at 66, however. Expecting Black B, Cho overlooked Black 67. White should have jumped to 1 in *Dia. 6*.



Dia. 6

White 66 led up to White 76, and then it almost looked as if Black could cut at 1 in *Dia. 7*. After White 14, Black could attack White's eye shape and start a capturing race, but the post-game conclusion was that Black would lose. In any event, after cutting White apart and forcing him to live with 90, Kobayashi played Black 91 to take control of the right side. Incredibly, Cho replied at 92.



Dia. 7





Figure 5 (93-122)


Figure 5 (93-122). *Cho rescues his stones.*

No one, least of all Kobayashi, dreamed that White could save his two stones on the right side, but although Cho was running short of time, that is what he did. Black 97 and 99 were the strongest resistance.


If Black plays 97 at 1 in *Dia. 8*, White plays 2 and 4, threatening 'a'. If Black plays 99 at 1 in *Dia. 9*, White lives with 2 to 6. White 100 to 104 prepared to live with White A. If Black plays 105 at 1 in *Dia. 10*, White escapes with 2 to 8. Cho played 92 in the last figure with a swooping gesture that may have meant he had all these variations read out.



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 6 (123-190). *Black resigns.*

Cho was playing in minute-a-move overtime, but he never let up. Kobayashi managed to give him just one scare, at Black 49. If White

connects at 1 in *Dia. 11*, Black 2 kills a big group. White seems to be alive, but Black 14 destroys the second eye.

Black resigns after White 190.

(Abridged from *Kido*, March 1997. Translated by James Davies.)





Figure 6 (123-190)



Dia. 11

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Satoru, 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Played on February 5-6, 1997.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi, 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-40). White invades.

What's phenomenal about Cho is his ability to play for two days without a single lapse

of concentration. Then there's his intensity: his ambitious openings, his sharp middle game, and his uncompromising endgame. Sometimes his intensity does him in, because he's always playing at the ragged edge. Sometimes he digs his own grave, but if you wait for that to happen, you'll never overcome him, especially not in a multiple-game match. To defeat him you need to muster even greater intensity, both on the board and within yourself. Cho belongs to the school that stresses the opening, and he is very good at it. The reason Cho lavishes so much time on the opening is probably that he sees the opening as having a direct effect on the outcome. In this game, he quickly occupied all four corners.






Figure 1 (1-40)




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

White played 20 to prevent Black A, and the moves from Black 21 to 29 are a standard pattern. Black can also play 25 at 1 in *Dia. 1*. If White plays 2, Black 3 lives in the corner alone, but Cho wasn't willing to let White play 2 in sente. White 30 was an innovation. Usually White plays 1 in *Dia. 2*, but that move invites Black 2 and 4, either immediately or later, so White 30 was a good idea. So was White's invasion at 32. If White played 32 at B, allowing Black C, the overall thickness White had been building would have no place to operate. Black 35, keeping White separated, was Cho's type of move, but since Black was already leading in territory, I think Black 1 in *Dia. 3* would have been adequate.



Dia. 3






Figure 2 (41-70)

Figure 2 (41-70). Both sides make dubious moves.

Black had a weak two-space extension in the center, so he played conservatively at 45. The alternative, Black 1 in *Dia. 4*, would produce the big exchange in *Dia. 5*, which might let White develop a good attack on the three black stones in the center. Note that Black can't play 9 at 10 in *Dia. 4*, because of the sequence White 9-Black 'a'-White 'b'. White 48 may have been too early, because Black 53, 55, and 57 weakened White's position.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5


In my opinion, White should first have played 1 in *Dia. 6* to prod Black into doing something that would strengthen White's center. *Dia. 6* is only one of many variations, but after White 19, White has nothing to fear from Black 'a' and 'b'. I think this is how White should have played. Since White played 48 first, he should have lost his chance to attack the three black stones in the center.



Dia. 6

After Black 61, Black could have put the game out of reach with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 7*. Cho let this chance slip, however, by playing Black

63. He may have hoped to plow up White's center while saving the three black stones, but White 64 and 66 were unexpectedly severe. What's more, Black 63 did not completely defend the upper side.



Dia. 7





Figure 3 (71-114)

Figure 3 (71-114). The lead swings back and forth


Far from getting settled, Black lost one stone in the center and White gained considerable prospective territory. Now Black was back where he started.

Black 93 was a mistake that Cho regretted afterward. Black had to connect at 1 in Dia. 8. After cutting at 2, White has to play 4 and 6 as in the game. Black does not continue by trying

to capture White with 'a', because then White plays 'b' and wins the capturing race. Instead, Black plays 1 in Dia. 9, forcing White to link up with 2 and 4, then plays 5. This is a lot better than what Black actually did, which left White with a big move at A, followed by Black B and White C. If White omits 2 in Dia. 8 and just plays 4 and 6, Black will play 'c'. It's slightly to White's advantage to make the 2-3 exchange. With A and C left, White was in the lead, until he played 106 and let Black's stones get linked up. That tipped the advantage back slightly in Black's favor.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9

White should have played 1 to 11 in Dia. 10, capturing four black stones. If Black plays 8 at 11, White plays 10, and if Black keeps going with Black 'a' and White 'b', his big group on the left side won't survive.



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (115–136). *Fatal mistake*

Cho's reading skills are legendary, but sometimes he comes unstuck. He lost this game by failing to answer White 28. He should have played *Dia. 11* to make sure of a second eye. According to my calculations, the sequence in that diagram leaves Black ahead by half a point, or a point and a half.




Figure 4 (115–136)





Figure 5 (137–158)




Dia. 11

Figure 5 (137–158). *A victory for the challenger*

Black had to connect at 37. If he gave up those four stones, he would lose the game. When White played 38 and 40, Cho must have realized his mistake, because he played 41 and let White kill the corner with 42. Black can't win the capturing race on the lower side. If Black had played 41 at 1 in *Dia. 12*, White 2

and 4 would have killed a bigger group. If Black plays 5, White plays 6, and the marked white stone is perfectly positioned. (If White plays 6 at 11, then Black 8, White 7, Black 'a', and Black lives.) Black 'b' on the right side doesn't work because of White 'c', although if White plays any move other than 'c', Black lives.



Dia. 12

The lead in this game kept swinging back and forth, but in the end Satoru seized on one mistake and wrapped everything up quickly.

Black resigns after White 158.

(Abridged from *Kido*, April 1997. Translated by James Davies.)

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Black: Kobayashi Satoru, 9-dan

Played on February 19–20, 1997.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi, 9-dan






Figure 1 (1-52)

Figure 1 (1-52). Doubtful and admirable moves

After some unorthodox maneuvers at Black 11 to 15, Black made a doubtful move at 21. Why he failed to play Black 1 in *Dia. 1* is a mystery, because if White cuts him off with 2 to 6, in time of need he can always make good eye shape with Black 7 to 11.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 23, however, was admirably ferocious. The message behind this move is that White cannot get away with playing 1 in *Dia. 2*; Black will counter with 2 and 4.

Black 35 was also admirable. If Black had won this game, Black 23 and 35 would have been the moves that brought him victory.




Figure 2 (53-101)

Figure 2 (53-101). Needless overplay

Because of Black's doubtful move at the marked stone in the opening, White was still slightly ahead. I think White could have kept that slight lead by playing 86 at 101, but Cho extended one point farther to the right. Black happily invaded at 91, and White's lead suddenly vanished.





Figure 3 (102-123)

Figure 3 (102-123). Black gets his chance.


When White made the knight's move at 2, Black forced at 3, then struck home at 5. White was now in real trouble. Black could have won by about three points just by playing 9 at 10. But Black 9 was not bad either, because if Black had played 17 at 1 in *Dia. 3*, he could

have captured either White's center group or his bottom group. If White defends the bottom group, Black attacks the center at 2 and White cannot make eyes. If White defends the center group with 2, Black plays the non-obvious moves at 3 and 5, and White's bottom group dies. If White plays 'a' after Black 9 in *Dia. 3*, Black plays 'b'. In the game, White could not be killed because he had a second eye at either A or B. At this point, Black had plenty of time left on his clock. If he had used it to read more deeply, he could have evened the match at two wins to two losses. In that case, I don't think you could predict who would have won in the end. Perhaps, this was just a case of misreading.



Dia. 3

Dia. 4 shows that the standard moves at Black 3 and 5 fail (which is why Black 3 at 'a' is good). When Black plays 7, White plays 8. Next, White can either make an eye at 'b' or link up with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', etc.



Dia. 4




Figure 4 (124-184)

Figure 4 (124-184). A solid finish by White

After Black missed his chance in the last figure, Cho took control of the game. First he made sure of life for his center group by playing White 26. Then when Black played 31 and 33, White gouged out maximum profit with 34 and 36 before finally returning to 54. One hopes that Satoru will do better next time, but I'd like to get back into one of these seven-game matches myself.

Black resigns after White 184.

(Abridged from *Kido*, April 1997. Translated by James Davies.)

Game Five

Our commentary on the final game takes the form of an interview with Cho. MA is the reporter for Igo Club, Murakami Akira.

White: Kobayashi Satoru

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on February 26 & 27, 1997.

A not completely satisfactory defence

MA: Defending the Kisei also means defending your Triple Crown. How do you feel about it now?

Cho: Well, of course I'm happy, but, to be honest, there's something nagging at me.

MA: What is that?

Cho: The fifth game was a masterpiece for Satoru — I was completely outplayed. I

naturally expected the series to go to the sixth game . . . This may sound arrogant, but I do feel a little that I wanted Satoru to win that game.

MA: I got the impression that your play in the fifth game was not very relaxed.

Cho: I consciously tried to adopt the good, vague moves of Satoru, but it didn't work out well.

MA: The general impression was that Satoru's go had changed a little.

Cho: I think it's got more severe. Maybe Satoru was at a turning point at which he was trying to change his game.

MA: Both of your games are still changing.




Figure 1 (1-29)

Figure 1 (1-29). *A move I didn't expect*

MA: This was your first niren-sei of the series. Do you work out in advance how you're going to play your first two moves or do you decide after sitting down at the board?

Cho: Half and half. This time I was planning to play the Chinese opening with 3 at 11, but I changed my mind.

MA: Is Black 7 better located there than at A after the joseki to 15?

Cho: You can't say either way. Of course, I also considered 7 at A, but I just had a feeling that the low move might be better.


MA: Black 7 is often played at B these days.

Cho: I can't say which would be better if

the same joseki from 8 to 15 were played.

MA: When you make the pincer at 17, the joseki to 26 can be expected — had you already thought of your next move?

Cho: Of course, but I miscalculated with 27. I expected White 28 at C and planned to jump to D. My plans were upset when White played 28. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* would have been a more consistent strategy.



Dia. 1: more consistent



*Cho strikes an unusual pose
(from the review after the game)*





Figure 2 (30-40)



Dia. 2: firmness is called for

Figure 2 (30-40). *The wrong time and place for a spongy move*

Cho: White 30 and 32 surprised me and at the same time filled me with admiration. You don't see these kind of moves played very often.

MA: You don't?

Cho: White simply plays at A. I thought that instead of 30 White might play at 40 immediately.

MA: White 30 helps Black to build momentum with 31 on.

Cho: However, Black 35 was awful. This stone has rotted.

MA: ...?

Cho: My aim was to play a spongy move, learning from Satoru's style, but I chose the wrong place for it. You play this kind of soft move when you're aiming at an attack. However, White 30-34 is solid, so 35 has no

effect on him whatsoever.

MA: So spongy moves are attacking moves?

Cho: The opponent is solid here, so you must resolutely settle the shape with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. After White 6, attacking at 7 would probably give an even game. If White 'a', Black plays 'b', sacrificing on a small scale.

MA: Black 35 looked natural to me.

Cho: If you just take a rough look at the board, then it may look like a good place, but there's no spirit in it. In my games, there's always a discord between refinement and realism [laughs], but Black 35 is not a real move.

MA: Who would have thought it was so bad?

Cho: After White 40, the game was already lost.




Figure 3 (41-50)

Figure 3 (41-50). *Satoru's superb artistry*

MA: Black's answer at 41 looks solid.

Cho: If the exchange of three stones on each side in the top right [30-35 in Figure 2] hadn't been made, then I might have felt inclined to attack at 50 instead of defending at 41, but with the white position there so solid, Black has no prospects of gaining from an attack. The way it was, I thought that I had no choice but to stake the game on my top and bottom territories.

MA: So 41 personifies patience.

Cho: I was thinking that I was going to lose in completely hopeless fashion ...

MA: With 43, you switched to attack.

Cho: I expected White to play 44 at 50 immediately. White 44 surprised me. When I pushed up at 45, I thought that my position had recovered a little, but . . .


MA: But not so?

Cho: I completely failed to see White 48 coming. The usual timing would be to use 48 to attach at 50. But playing 50 after Black 49 has greater profundity. White 44 to 50 show Satoru at his best. The instant White attached at 50 I thought I was in bad trouble.

MA: What if White connects at 1 in *Dia. 3* instead of 48? There was also a theory that White should play 48 at 'a'.

Cho: I thought that I wouldn't lose if I played 2 and 4, cutting this line in White's position.

MA: I don't understand it all, but it seems we've witnessed some superb artistry on Satoru's part.



Dia. 3: Black would be confident

Figure 4 (51–66). Miscalculation on top of miscalculation

Cho: At first I thought I might as well collapse by playing Black 51 at 52, White 62, Black 51, but then I got a grip on myself.

MA: How would you collapse?

Cho: White cuts at A, and Black probably collapses.

MA: If Black ataries at 54 instead of 53?

Cho: It's ironic the way the position is set up. If Black 1 to White 4 in *Dia. 4*, then it's hopeless if Black can't cut at 5, but the peep of White 6 works perfectly, setting up a ladder.





Figure 4 (51–66)



Dia. 4: nicely set up for White

MA: I see. If Black 'a', White captures with 'b'.

Cho: When I woke up to this, I had to change plans with 53.

MA: A large-scale variation followed after Black 57.

Cho: Here, too, I made a serious oversight. That is, I believed that White couldn't jump to 56 when Black played 55. Cutting with 57 to 61 would be good enough, I thought . . . I didn't notice White 66.

MA: Having White jump to 56 was not part of your plan.

Cho: I thought that extending at 57 with 56 was the only move. I believed that I could then get a reasonable game by forcing with Black B through White E, then pressing at Black F. The instant White jumped to 56, I realized he could play 66 and was appalled. I had no choice but to go through with 57 anyway.





Figure 5 (67-86)

71: connects



Dia. 5: the direct method backfires

Figure 5 (67-86). Both sides pessimistic

MA: The squeeze from 68 feels good. But I have no idea what happens after it.

Cho: Black has captured the centre five white stones, but he mustn't let the bottom right black stones be captured on a large scale.

MA: The hane and connection of 76 and 78 look like calm moves.

Cho: They're the only moves. If White tries to capture directly with 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black resists with 2. After White 3, Black can play 4 and 6; if White blocks the connection with 7, White finds that he is the one in trouble after Black 8.

MA: Can't White live with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'?

Cho: He can live, but the bottom line is that he can't answer 8 at 'd' immediately.

MA: In short, Black also lives.

Cho: Black 81 half saves the group.

MA: If Black plays 81 at 82, White can now capture the group with good aji with White A. Well, then, what do you think of the result to 86?

Cho: Of course, it's good for White. I thought I had lost. But the funny thing is that after the game Satoru said he thought it was bad for White.

MA: At least, it probably wasn't as bad for Black as you thought.




Figure 6 (87-100)

Figure 6 (87-100). Patience would have been the greater virtue.

Cho: Peeping once at 91 was OK, but seeking immediate life with 93 and 95 made it definitely a losing game for Black.

MA: What else could Black do?


Cho: Black could use 93 to attach at A or perhaps at B. I was aiming at various moves, but they were too difficult, so I gave up on all of them.

MA: If you had thought you were definitely losing, wouldn't you have tried something?

Cho: Rather than that, Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 6* instead of 91 are moves that can't be slighted. At a glance, the large endgame moves White has after Black 5 are 'a', 'b', and 'c'. If you assume there are just these three points, White will get two of them, for a favourable result, but actually there's one more: 'd'. If Black gets to turn at 'd', the game is quite close.

MA: Just what I thought! [laughter] The

way you've been telling the story, it's sounded as if the game was very bad for Black.




Dia. 6: a consistent policy of patience

Cho: Right through the course of this game so far, Black has been playing patiently. My main regret is that I didn't continue to do so, as in *Dia. 6*, even if that would have lost. That way I would have learnt something for Game Six on.

MA: If Black plays 97 at C?

Cho: White plays D and easily lives inside my group. The forcing move of 96 was very well timed.

[Just for reference, we offer *Dia. 7*, from the Yomiuri Newspaper, which shows one way for White to live. The players following the game on the spot believed that at this point White was leading.]



Dia. 7: White lives

Figure 7 (101-142). *Dodging on the brink of disaster*

Cho: White's moves from 2 on have a beautiful flow. It's strange that even despite this Satoru didn't think he was ahead.

MA: Without Black 9, White strikes at 24 and captures a few stones.

Cho: Black 33 was awful. I thought it was

unreasonable, but, since I was losing anyway, I yielded to the impulse to play it.

MA: Could Black have used 37 to cut at 1 in *Dia. 8*?





Figure 7 (101-142)

Cho: White has sente moves above. For example, after White 2 to Black 5, White jumps to 6 — if now Black 'a', White captures three stones with 'b'. I was really tempted to cut anyway and collapse, but I restrained myself.



Dia. 8: Black loses something

MA: I was watching the game at this point on satellite TV. Your hand hovered around the centre and really seemed about to cut, but when the timekeeper reached '8', you suddenly switched to the top right. Al-

most faster than the eye could see. [laughter]

Cho: Really? I don't remember.

MA: It was dramatic.

Cho: I realized later that I could have safely played 37 at A. When White links at 42, Black 33 becomes *mochikomi* (a loss without compensation), so Black is clearly losing.






Figure 8 (143–170)



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 8 (143–170). *Relief produces the losing move.*

MA: White connected the wrong way with 56.

Cho: If he plays at 1 in *Dia. 9*, he doesn't have to add a stone after Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. The instant White connects at 56, the game becomes a loss for him. Normally, you'd expect White to get the endgame move of A, yet Black eliminates it in sente. White loses about four points here.

MA: It's unbelievable that Kobayashi would make this kind of mistake.

Cho: Black's outright loss of a stone in the centre had given White a sure lead. This sense of relief led him to make a good-*aji* answer without thinking. Actually, at the

time neither of us realized that there had been an upset.

MA: There was a theory that it would still have been better for White to play 58 at 1 in *Dia. 10*. How about the trade of Black 2 and White 3? If Black plays 2 at 3, White connects at 'a', making *miai* of the cut at 'b' and 'c'.

Cho: There's no point saying that. Satoru considered only the sequence to 62 in the figure.




Figure 9 (171–233)

113: ko (at 101); 116: ko; 123: connects (at 84);
126: connects (at 101); 130: connects (above 82);
133: connects (at 88)

Figure 9 (171–233). *Surprised to find I'd won*

Cho: When I captured at 71, I realized that something funny was going on. I was supposed to be losing, yet when I counted the score, I was ahead. I was astonished.

MA: This became a phantom masterpiece for Kobayashi.

Cho: Throughout the series, my play was the worse of the two, as far as content went. Game Four was another game Satoru should have won. It felt all the more strange to win like this when I thought that my form had been bad since the end of last year. I naturally thought there would be a sixth game.

MA: But we can expect Kobayashi to emerge again.


Black wins by 1½ points.

(Igo Club, May 1997. Translated by John Power.)

An Introduction to Tesuji (viii)


by Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan

This series, for novice players, covers all the basic tesujis that you are likely to encounter in your games in easy-to-understand positions. In the last installment we showed you some tesujis that can give your stones life. In this issue we are going to give you examples of tesujis that make good shape. First, try solving the three problems given below. Answers and other examples begin on the next page.




Problem 1. Black to play

Black's two stones are in danger. How should Black defend them?



Problem 2. Black to play

How can Black utilize his marked stone to make good shape on the outside?



Problem 3. Black to play


The ladder at Black A is unfavorable, so Black's three stones at the top are captured. How can Black utilize these stones to make good shape?

Stopping the Monkey Jump (ii)


The monkey jump is probably the best-known of all endgame tesujis. There is even a proverb which says, 'The monkey jump is worth eight points.' This evaluation, however, cannot be completely relied upon. Depending on the position, its value can sometimes be more and sometimes less. Nevertheless, the monkey jump is a big endgame move, and the side that plays it usually ends in sente.

Once your opponent has played a monkey jump into your territory, the onus is upon you to contain it and keep the damage to a minimum. This is sometimes tricky, but by the time you finish studying this two-part article, you should be able to correctly defend against this tesuji in most positions.

In the last issue, we studied three problems. We begin here with two more.



Problem 4



Problem 5

An Introduction to Tesuji: Answers

Problem 1. Defending efficiently


When you defend endangered stones, thinking only about saving them is not enough. You must also think about the follow-up moves: how will this move enable you to attack the opponent's stones or how will it help you make more territory?

Dia. 1. Black's stones come under attack.


If you only need to save your two stones, Black 1 would be satisfactory. However, after White plays 2 or 'a', the five black stones on the right are heavy and will come under attack.

Dia. 2. Tesuji

The tesuji in this position is to jump to Black 1. Now, Black 'a' is a strong follow-up.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3. Can't cut.


Cutting with White 1 is unreasonable. If White tries to escape, Black can capture the white stones with the ladder to 6.

Dia. 4. Good shape

If White pushes with 2, Black can expand his territory at the top with 3. White's three stones in the center are still under attack.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 5. Bad shape for Black

The diagonal connection results in bad shape for Black after White attaches at 2. After Black defends his two stones with 3, White


can continue to attack with 'a'. This result is similar to *Dia. 1*.

Dia. 6. Defective shape

The shape of Black's stones is defective. How should Black play to fix up his shape?



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 7. The diagonal move


This time the diagonal connection of Black 1 is the tesuji that makes good shape. If White answers with 2, Black makes eye shape with 3.

Dia. 8. Black's position is wide open.

Descending to Black 1 seems to be the territorial move, but White slides to 2. Next, the peep of White 4 is rather annoying. Black still doesn't have two eyes.




Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 9. A half-way move

Compared to 'a' (Black 1 in *Dia. 7*), Black 1 is not very efficient. After White 2, Black 'b' is the proper move, but White ataris and Black must fight a ko when he answers at 'a'.



Dia. 9

Problem 2. The use of forcing moves


Forcing moves are often useful in making good shape. Such moves can give you a stone that will impede your opponent's attack or they can provide you with the two moves you need to make good shape.

Dia. 1. Tesuji


Bumping against the white stone with 1 is the tesuji for making good shape. Next —

Dia. 2. Good shape

Black 1 threatens to capture two white stones, so White must capture the stone in the corner with 2. Next, Black restricts the marked stone with 3. Later, the forcing move of 'a' is Black's privilege.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3. Unreasonable


If White answers Black 1 with 2, Black captures two stones with 3.

Dia. 4. Simple-minded

Black 1 lacks a plan. After White 2, Black has no follow-up move. However, White can peep with 'a', making the black stones heavy and vulnerable to attack.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 5. Application


Here, the marked white stone is high on the fourth line. Against Black 1, White must defend with 2, so Black can make good shape with 3.

Dia. 6. Linking up

This position resulted from a star-point joseki. How can Black link up his stone on the left with his group on the right?




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 7. The peep

The peep of Black 1 is the tesuji. After White connects with 2, Black can link up with 3.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. The link-up can't be broken


If White tries to break through with 1, Black 2 keeps his stones connected.

Dia. 9. Without the peep


If Black neglects to peep and simply jumps to 1, White will jump to 2 and the black stone on the left will be isolated. If Black now peeps at 'a', White will connect at 'b'; the black stone on the left is still isolated.

Dia. 10. A forcing move

The forcing move of Black 1 can't stop White from linking up. The problem here, however, is where to play after White 2.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Dia. 11. The best shape


After Black 1, White must defend at 2. As a result, Black gets a thick shape and ends in sente. Next, Black can use this sente either to extend to 'a' or, if he already has an extension down the right side, to build a moyo at 'b'.

Dia. 12. A crude move

Black 1 is a crude move. White defends with 2, then goes on the attack with 4 and 6, building influence toward the left. Black is short of liberties and the cut at 'a' will be a source of bad aji.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Problem 3. Squeezing techniques


Squeezing is an important technique for making good shape. By squeezing, you can force your opponent's stones into an inefficient clump, while making good shape for your own stones.

Dia. 1. The squeeze


Since the ladder is unfavorable, Black has no choice but to sacrifice his stones at the top and squeeze with the sequence from Black 1 to 5.

Dia. 2. An inefficient clump of stones

White is in atari, so he must connect at 1, leaving him with an inefficient clump of stones. Next, Black 2, aiming at the attachment of 'a', is the vital point for good shape.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3. Crude moves


Black 1 and 3 are crude moves. There is a big difference between the way White captures a stone here and *Dia. 2*.

Dia. 4. A similar example

In this example, Black sacrifices three stones again, but this time he must take into consideration the marked stone.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 5. Preparatory moves


Black should first atari at 1, then jump ahead of the four white stones and attach at 3.

Dia. 6. Good shape

White must now capture the three black stones with 1 and 3, but Black 4 secures his stones on the outside with good shape. The point 'a' is Black's privilege, so there is no hurry to play it.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 7. A lukewarm move

Casting a net with 1 is a lukewarm move. Black can squeeze with 3, and later with 'a', but because of the marked white stone, there are no prospects for black territory on the right side.




Dia. 7

(Let's Go, August 1994. Translated by the editor.)


Stopping the Monkey Jump: Answers

Answer to Problem 4




Dia. 1. Usual answers are inappropriate

A White descent to 'a', threatens to kill the black stones in the corner. In *Problem 3* in our last installment (see *Go World* #78, pages 59 to 61), it was seen that trying to stop the monkey jump with 'b', 'c', or 'd' provokes White to play 'a', so these moves fail.




Dia. 2. Failure 1

What about attaching on the outside with Black 1?




Dia. 3. A ko

White will respond with the diagonal move of 2. Black 3 stops the monkey jump, but White can then start a ko for the life of the corner with 4 and 6.




Dia. 4. Black's territory is destroyed

If Black falls back to defend the corner with 3, White will atari with 4 and Black's territory on the right is destroyed.




Dia. 5. Failure 2

What happens if Black retreats to 1?



Dia. 6. White breaks through

Again White plays the diagonal move of 2, forcing Black to defend at 3. However, White can push onwards with 4 and make a deep incursion into Black's territory on the right.




Dia. 7. Unfortunate, but —

Unfortunately, Black has no choice but to retreat to 1. White can further reduce Black's territory with 2, ending in sente. However, this is two points better than the result in *Dia. 6*. The important thing, however, is that Black's stones in the corner are in no danger.


Answer to Problem 5

Black's position in this problem is thin and his stones are too far away to back up his defense.




Dia. 1. Failure 1

The first move many players will think of is Black 1, but this doesn't work.




Dia. 2. White slips through

White extends to 2, then, when Black plays 3, White ataris with 4 and the stone at Black 3 is captured. A black stone on the third line above 4 is necessary for this defense to work.




Dia. 3. A huge loss

After White 4 in the preceding diagram, Black has to limit his loss. The best he can do is to play 5 to 9. Black must not exchange 'a' for White 'b' because if White captures at 'b', Black 9 will not stop White from advancing into Black's territory. However, Black 9 is gote, so White can push up at 'a' in sente. Black has suffered a huge loss.




Dia. 4. Failure 2

Black 1 is better than *Dia. 1*, but it also fails. After White 2 —




Dia. 5. Defends the bottom

Black can defend his territory at the bottom with 3 and 5, but his territory around 4 has been wiped out.



Dia. 6. Failure 3


Black 1 and 3 also fail. After Black hanes at 3 —



Dia. 7. Black suffers a big loss


12: connects

White cuts with 3, then crawls along the first line with 6 and 8. The loss is not as large as in *Dia. 3*, but Black can do better than this.




Dia. 8. Aiming for an atari

Instead of 5 in *Dia. 7*, Black might jump to 1. But after White ataris with 2 —



Dia. 9. Black connects


If Black connects with 3 and defends his territory on the right with 5, 7, and 9, his territory around 3 and 4 has been wiped out.



Dia. 10. Squeezing


4: connects (below 2)

Instead of connecting with 3 in *Dia. 9*, squeezing with 1 and 3 here aim to take sente. However, the cut at White 'a' still remains. This result is still not the best.




Dia. 11. White will play elsewhere

Since White ends in gote in *Dia. 10*, he will probably leave the situation here as it is and not play 2 in *Dia. 8*; instead, he will aim to play the moves up to 4 in *Dia. 10* later on.



Dia. 12. The best way


Instead of the hane of 3 in *Dia. 6*, Black should simply jump to 3 as in this diagram.



Dia. 13. The least damage


10: connects at 5

The right time to hane with 5 is if White starts to move into Black's territory on the right with 4. White must cut with 6, so Black squeezes with 7 and 9. After White connects with 10, Black defends by connecting at 11.



Dia. 14. Comparison 1

If Black connects at 8 in answer to White 6, White will end up two points better than *Dia. 13*. If Black ataris with 7 and lets White capture with 8, the result is shown in the next diagram.




Dia. 15. Comparison 2

In *Dia. 10*, White captured stones at 'a' and 'b'; he even connected at 'b'. However, in this diagram no stone was captured at 'a' and White has not connected at 'b', so Black 'c', which threatens a ko, has more value here than in *Dia. 10*. For these reasons, Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 12* are the strongest moves.


Ignoring the Monkey Jump

A discussion of the monkey jump would not be complete without looking at how to continue if your opponent ignores it and plays elsewhere. You might think that if one large knight's jump works, another large knight's jump, such as Black 1 in *Dia. 1*, would work just as well. This is not the case.



Dia. 1

After Black plays 1 in *Dia. 1*, White can cut it off with the sequence from 2 to 12 in *Dia. 2*. The marked stone has become a wasted move.




Dia. 2: A wasted move

11: connects at 4


The small knight's move of Black 1 in *Dia. 3* is not any better. White can also cut off this stone with the sequence to White 8.

Well, what is the best way to continue if White doesn't answer the monkey jump?




Dia. 3: The small knight's move also fails

Any follow-up to the monkey jump should be a tight move; otherwise it is likely to become a wasted move. Four continuations are possible: 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd' in *Dia. 4*.




Dia. 4

Of these four moves, Black 1 in *Dia. 5* and Black 1 in *Dia. 6* are the most commonly played. Black 1 in *Dia. 5* is usually played when White's position at the bottom is low, while the diagonal move of Black 1 in *Dia. 6* is played when White's position at the bottom is high.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6


Six Monkey-Jump Problems

We conclude this article with six problems. You are asked to find the best way for Black to defend against White's monkey jump. The answers will appear in the next issue.


Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3




Problem 4



Problem 5



Problem 6



New Moves and New Josekis

by Lee Chang-ho

Recently, some serious consideration has been given to the double 5-3 point opening of Black 3 and 5. Black's aim is to jump to A, making the well-known 'pill-box' formation. If White wants to thwart this strategy, he will jump into the middle of this 'diagonal jump' by playing on the vital point of 6. How should Black respond?




Figure 1 (1-6)

White: Kim Sung-rong; Black: Lee Chang-ho

Dia. 1. Sanren-sei versus the pillbox

If White ignores Black's schemes on the right, he would most likely adopt a sanren-sei strategy on the left side. If Black makes the pill-box formation with 2, White will take another star point on the upper side with 3. After this, Black will strive to develop his thickness on the right.


Dia. 2. Jumping in the middle

What about jumping in between the black stones with White 1? Black has no other move but the cap of 2. Next, White can exploit Black's weaknesses at A and B.


Dia. 3. White can't fight the ko.

If White pushes through with 1 and turns at 3, Black will block with 4. White captures with 5 and 7, and Black starts a ko with 8. White can't afford to fight this ko because he


is lacking ko threats, this being the beginning of the game.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 4. The strongest moves

Against Black 1, pushing through again on the other side with White 2 is another variation. The sequence from Black 5 to 13 shows the strongest moves for both sides.


Dia. 5. Black's profit is big.

Continuing from the previous diagram, if White plays 2 and 4, Black 5 becomes the vital point. White captures with 10 and extends to

12, but with the large profit Black gets in the corner by playing 11, this result favors Black.




Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 6. Bad for White

If White attaches with 1, Black captures two stones with 2. If White extends to 3, Black will crawl to 12, and White's stones in the corner are in trouble after Black plays 14.



Dia. 6


Dia. 6. Bad for White

If White attaches with 1, Black captures two stones with 2. If White extends to 3, Black will crawl to 12, and White is in trouble after Black plays 14.


Dia. 7. Black is thick.

White can capture two black stones with 3 to 7, but Black's thickness is overwhelming

after he captures with 4 and makes shape with 8.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. White's correct response

After 2 in Dia. 4, the diagonal move of White 1 is the correct response. Black connects with 2 and White takes profit in the corner with the sequence to 7. Next, Black extends to 8, a move that works well with his thickness below. Both sides are satisfied with this result.




Figure 2 (1-17)

Figure 2 (1-17). The continuation

After White 1 (White 6 in Figure 1), the game continued up to White 17. Black gets thickness on the outside, but White's profit in the lower right corner is not small. Both sides were satisfied with this result.

(From *Sekai no Shinte, Shingata* by Lee Chang-ho. Translated by the editor.)

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